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It is now more than five years since the Oceans Act came into force as Canada’s modern legal 
framework for integrated coastal and ocean management (ICOM).1 Although there have been 
several integrated management initiatives at the national, regional and provincial level, the 
assessment of the record to date is not a simple matter. This difficulty is well illustrated by the 
recent Parliamentary review of the Oceans Act and the federal government’s response.2 The 
House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (Standing Committee) 
recently concluded that 
 
the Oceans Act is fundamentally sound and [the Committee] does not recommend any major 
amendments to the Act at this time. Nevertheless, the Committee has some concerns over the 
administration of certain aspects of the Act. Certain principles and programs that were key 
elements of the Act do not appear to have been as fully implemented as they could or should have 
been. In addition, a number of more specific concerns were raised particularly with respect to the 
creation of Marine Protected Areas and Integrated Management (Part II, Oceans Management 
Strategy) and marine services (Part III, Powers, Duties and Functions of the Minister) that the 
Committee believes should be given due consideration.3  
 
                                                 
1 S.C. 1996, c. 31. Introduced as Bill C-98 in 1995, it was re-introduced as Bill C-26 and 
adopted in the 1995-96 legislative session. The Oceans Act was assented to on 18 December 
1996 and came into force on 31 January 1997. 
2 The review of the Oceans Act by the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans is 
required by s. 52 of the act (ibid). This section provides for the comprehensive review of the 
administration of the act and recommendations for amendments or administration.  
3 See the various review reports of the Standing Committee and in particular the fourth 
Report on the Oceans Act, Wayne Easter, M.P., Chair (House of Commons, Ottawa: October 




The Standing Committee had held hearings across Canada and received many inputs from 
diverse interests groups. These inputs are visible in the 16 recommendations proposed by the 
Standing Committee.  
 
In its response to the Standing Committee’s recommendations the federal government is 
of the view that although there is still much to be done, much has been accomplished at the same 
time.4 The federal government expressed pleasure that the act is seen as fundamentally sound.  It 
listed many coastal and ocean initiatives as part of the record of the administration of the act. The 
specific responses provided to each recommendation are more reserved. Through guarded 
language the federal government disagreed with5 or offered explanation or clarification of the 
basis6 of many of the recommendations. Where the government tended to agree it showed a 
willingness to consider or agree with in part7 or simply confirm that the recommendation was 
already being followed in whole or in part.8 Only one recommendation was agreed to without 
                                                 
4 Government Response to the Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and 
Oceans, “Report on the Oceans Act” (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, March 
2002). Much of the federal government response emanates from the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans which was the principal institution addressed by the Standing Committee. 
5 Responses to: recommendation one (enactment of regulations under the act);  
recommendation two (references to fishermen and their organizations to be consulted under the 
act); recommendation seven (converting the minister’s discretionary duty to consult to an 
obligation in s. 33[3]); recommendation 12 (minister should play a proactive lead role), where 
the government avoids a direct response to the criticism implicit in this recommendation, and 
provides information on various activities including the process for the long overdue national 
oceans management strategy; recommendation 16 (cost-effective manner of delivery of marine 
services). Ibid. 
6 Responses to: recommendation four (establishment of an interdepartmental committee 
for stewardship and sustainable management); recommendation 11 (DFO’s primary 
responsibility for ocean management in Canada); recommendation 13 (marine services or ice-
breaking fees); recommendation 14 (application of marine service fees to ferries). Ibid. 
7 Responses to: recommendation two (annual state of the oceans report), where the 
government response in essence agreed to produce such a report every three-to-five years; 
response to recommendation six (definition or clarification of terms in s. 35[1]), where 
government agrees with the need for definition of various terms but disagrees with a legislative 
intervention to do so. Ibid.  
8 Responses to: recommendation five (publication of information on MPA sites in the 
Oceans Program Tracking System); recommendation eight (environmental assessment under 
federal legislation of offshore exploration in the Gulf of St. Lawrence); recommendation nine 
(offshore development guidelines to better inform developers of licence limitations); 






This exchange is evidence of the intertwining political with bureaucratic agendas and 
processes over the key legislation prescribing integration in Canada. It serves to illustrate a major 
challenge for scholar and practitioner alike: how to assess the record on integration to date in the 
context of conflicting claims. The assessment of integrated coastal and ocean management 
(ICOM) initiatives is difficult for a number of reasons including complexity, lack of well-
established and documented baselines, unclear or insufficient indicators, lack of systematic 
project monitoring and time frame of review to capture stated short, medium to long-term goals. 
The identification of indicators can be particularly difficult as it may not always be possible to 
quantify results, and important as qualitative assessments may be, they are necessarily prone to 
highly subjective interpretation moderated only by political justifications and bureaucratic 
constraints. This complex task is further accentuated in the context of states with complex 
systems of government operating in situations of geographical, ecosystemic, political, socio-
economic and cultural diversity. Federal states are a case in point. Understanding how well a 
particular initiative is doing may depend on individual observation, motive, context and point in 
time. Much is at stake: Canada’s ocean activities account for an estimated $20 billion in annual 
domestic economic activity, and this figure does not represent the total value of the country’s 
seaborne trade.10 In addition, the fate of coastal and marine ecosystems, and the well-being of 
innumerable aboriginal and coastal communities also depend on the management of the marine 
environment. 
 
This chapter attempts to rationalize an approach to assessing federal policy, planning or 
management initiatives by developing a theoretical framework drawing from Canadian ICOM 
practices. It then proceeds to consider specific experiences in the context of this framework in 
Canada. The experiences are a mixture “old” and “new” federal initiatives at the national and 
regional levels.  The Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP) can be considered a “mature” 
initiative because of its longevity (10 years in existence). Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our 
Oceans, Our Future (Oceans Strategy) is only a few months old, but it was preceded by a five-
year gestation period. The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Initiative (ESSIM) is 
still at a gestation phase, but the initiative commenced in 1999. Despite the “immaturity’ of the 
latter two, both provide useful insights into the concept and practice of integration, and for this 
purpose offer a useful comparison to ACAP. All three have grappled or are grappling with 
integration in their own individual way, but in a common constitutional context. The Oceans 
Strategy is different from the other two in that it is national in vocation and character. ACAP and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Board). Ibid. 
9 Response to recommendation 15 concerning the provision of the results of the Treasury 
Board evaluation of marine services or ice-breaking fees to the Standing Committee. Ibid. 
10 Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans 




ESSIM are regional, both in the Atlantic, but are led by two different lead agencies, respectively 
Environment Canada and DFO. All three offer a challenge to assessment. 
 
The authors identify questions to be asked and factors to be weighed in relation to both 
the development process of an initiative, the decision as manifested in text, and actual results 
where these are ascertained. It is submitted that the questions and factors put forward can 
reasonably be expected to facilitate or constrain the pursuit of the integrated approach in Canada. 
The assessment of the integration record requires a sifting of buzz words. The analysis leads to a 
qualitative assessment and conclusions on what could or should have been achieved, or likely to 
be achieved, given intended objectives and the influence of relevant factors. In effect, this 
approach produces “relative judgments.”  
 
Because of the experimental nature of this study, the authors do not embark on in-depth 
influence analysis, but rather propose what they hope will be a useful systematic approach for 
more in-depth analysis of case studies. Although applied in a federal context, the analytical 
framework would be equally useful to the study of provincial initiatives. Although not a purpose 
of this chapter, a study of provincial initiatives can also be expected to provide useful insights. 
The authors draw on primary materials, mainstream and gray literature, and personal knowledge 
of various processes and initiatives they themselves have participated in. Time constraints did 




ICOM initiatives in Canada occur in theatres of biogeophysical, socio-economic and cultural 
diversity. Canada borders on the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The differences between 
these three marine environments is further accentuated by intra-regional ecosystemic diversity.11 
In addition to the oceans, the Great Lakes constitute significant hydrospace which is subject to 
many of the interests and activities that marine areas are subject to. In all regions, Canada also 
has extensive river systems with an intricate relationship to the marine environment. The subject 
of lakes and rivers has repercussions for the definition of management areas that might need to 
include watersheds.  
 
The socio-economic and cultural differences are also significant. New Brunswick is the 
only officially bilingual province, while Newfoundland and Labrador is the province with the 
highest persistent unemployment rates in Canada. The level of wealth across the country is very 
variable, with the poorest provinces and highest rates of unemployment being in the Atlantic 
                                                 
11 The National Marine Conservation Areas System Plan developed by the Parks Agency 
lists 29 different marine regions in the Arctic Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, Great Lakes and Pacific 
Ocean, each with distinct physical and biological characteristics; 
http://parkscanada.pch.gc.ca/nmca/nmca/index.html (accessed 28 October 2002). See also 
Guiding Principles and Operational Policies (Parks Canada, Minister of Supply and Services 




region. The Arctic region presents a totally different scene with a fragile environment, low 
population density, dominant aboriginal people presence and growing political consciousness 
and aspirations.  
 




The drivers of the policy-making, planning or management process are a first consideration. Is 
the process a result of foresight or simply a reaction to an unforeseen problem, event or 
emergency? The challenge for the decision-maker is to remain ahead of events so as to avoid 
substituting reactive for proactive approaches. Reactive approaches may lead to inefficient 
responses and defensive posturing, possibly characterised by optics more than content, in the 
light of uneasiness of political masters and public critique. 
 
Sectoral and integrated coastal and ocean initiatives in Canada have been generally the 
result of triggers or pressures. The triggers have tended to be singular or series of events 
frequently leading to a crisis and which have served to prod government into action. These have 
not necessarily been unforeseeable and yet decision-makers remained unprepared. The 1999 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Marshall triggered a series of important 
developments in aboriginal rights in coastal and ocean resource development, but in reality the 
growth in constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights was foreseeable as a result of preceding 
case law.12 Since the Constitution Act, 1982 there has emerged a pattern in the constitutional 
recognition of aboriginal rights in Canada.13 However, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
(DFO) was unprepared for the assertion of fishing and other rights by First Nation bands in areas 
licensed to other local resource users and the conflict this generated. The collapse of the northern 
Atlantic cod stocks in the early 1990s was the result of longstanding overfishing. It led to a series 
of haphazard political, management and fiscal responses by the federal government. The Atlantic 
Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) was one such federal response instituted as a result of the Northern 
Cod collapse in the 1990s.14  
Pressures have tended to influence the development of initiatives as a result of osmosis. 
                                                 
12 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, in a split 3-2 decision. Prior to Marshall the 
Supreme Court of Canada had already confirmed the existence of an aboriginal right to fish for 
food, social and ceremonial purposes. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
13 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1). 
14 For an overview of TAGS, see Newfoundland Fishery Education home page 
http://www.stemnet.nf.ca/cod/tags1.htm (accessed 28 October 2002); Standing Committee on 
Fisheries and Oceans, “The East Coast Report,” 
 http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/36/1/FISH/Studies/Reports/fishrp01/03presenta-e.htm 




Pressures are influences resulting directly from larger policy initiatives or changes in the 
governance environment.  In the 1990s the privatization drive across a range of government 
services affected maritime administration services. The introduction of marine service fees and 
privatization of oil spill response were part of this phenomenon. Somewhat similarly, the 
Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP) was influenced by the trend for inclusive participation 
in resource management. ACAP thus employs a stakeholder-based approach under the influence 
of a growing trend in community-based co-management.15 
 
Ideally in ICOM the decision-maker should be rationalizing decisions on the basis of 
projected goals and objectives based on foresight, in addition to responding to crises. ICOM is 
much more than crisis management. Sustainability requires ongoing costs/benefits assessment 
with reference to an ecosystem’s ability to produce the intended goods and services.   
 
Problem-response and baselines 
 
There are three tasks to address in this factor. The first addresses to what extent, if at all, is a 
particular initiative problem-oriented, and at what scale? Is it responding to a problem as it has 
arisen, or is it anticipating it? The relevance of this question is for the assessment of the overall 
response (is it anticipatory or reactive?) and the clarity of stated goals and objectives. Naturally, 
clarity is highly desirable. At the same time, however, it will be important to ascertain whether 
goals and objectives leave room for flexibility to enable appropriate responses to unforeseen 
issues as they might arise. Ideally, an ICOM initiative should manifest a long-term vision and an 
ability to respond to issues as they arise while maintaining a steady course. 
 
The second task is to ascertain the existence of an integrated approach and then to assess 
how it is formulated. The key concept of integration is central to ICOM and is widely recognized 
as a basic principle.16 It is a response to the sectoralization of the environment and, in a marine 
context, the piecemeal approach to ocean development that remains so pervasive in many parts 
of the world. Sectoralization frequently results in multiple use conflicts and adverse 
consequences on the marine environment because the activities of other users and the cumulative 
                                                 
15 J. P. Ellsworth, L.P. Hildebrand and E.A. Glover,  “Canada’s Atlantic Coastal Action 
Program: A Community-based Approach to Collective Governance,”36 Ocean & Coastal 
Management Journal 121-142 (1997). 
16 “Integration” as a principle of environmental planning in Principle 13 of the 
Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/STOCKHOLM-DECL.txt (accessed 5 November 
2002). On the integration in an oceans context see: Arild Underdal, “Integrated Marine Policy: 
What? Why? How?” Marine Policy 159-169 (1980); Edward L. Miles, “Future Challenges in 
Ocean Management: Towards Integrated National Ocean Policy,” in Paolo Fabbri, ed., Ocean 
Management in Global Change (London: Elsevier, 1992), 595-620; Jean-Pierre Levy, “A 




environmental impacts are not anticipated. The integrated approach requires a holistic approach, 
where local action must take place within the context of the “big picture.” Thus, the manner in 
which a problem is identified and formulated must take into consideration its context. The 
integrated approach also has implications for management area and institutional responses, 
which will be discussed below. 
 
The third task concerns baselines. The function of baselines is to enable performance 
measurement against a starting point in fact and time. This is a requirement of any evaluation 




In the case of planning and management initiatives, provision for the definition of the operational 
area or the actual definition of such area is closely related to the problem addressed. Does the 
problem define the area, or does the area define the problem? These are two approaches. 
 
The first approach suggests a functionalist approach, whereby area definition is premised 
by the full extent of the problem, its impacts and the response needs. Of the two, theoretically 
this is the more consistent with the integrated approach and in theory better enables an 
ecosystem-based approach, as long as the management area coincides with the relevant 
ecosystem. Size per se is not necessarily an issue. There could be management and 
administrative disadvantages, such as how far the logic of integration might take problem 
definition and identification of a relevant ecosystem, and the involvement of more institutional 
actors with different mandates. Ecosystem boundaries might not be easy to define and in any 
case are not likely to be permanent. A functionalist approach here would suggest that boundaries 
might need to be reviewed in the light of changing scientific evidence and understanding. 
 
The second approach suggests an administrative premise, whereby a jurisdictional area is 
defined in advance, followed by an identification of problems in the area that can be addressed 
pursuant to institutional mandate. There is convenience, simplicity and clarity in the applicability 
of a mandate-based approach. These benefits might occur at the cost of relevance and 
effectiveness. A major difficulty here is that the problem might not be dealt with holistically and 
that an ecosystem-based approach might not be possible. 
 
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. What is useful here is to ascertain 
to what extent these strengths and weaknesses are recognised in an initiative and the particular 






The knowledge-base that the decision is drawing upon is a relevant factor and several questions 




of knowledge could result in an initiative which is more politically than knowledge-driven. 
 
How is that knowledge created and is it accessible? The integrated approach necessitates 
a multi-disciplinary knowledge of a problem, and this in turn might result in an interdisciplinary 
response. Also relevant here is the extent to which the approach to knowledge-building is 
inclusive of sources other than natural science so as to include other disciplines, traditional 
ecological knowledge and local user or community knowledge. An inclusive approach suggests 
that the knowledge is not elitist, but rather canvasses all available sources. This could be very 
significant in the eyes of participating actors. Also useful to ascertain here is to what extent a 
government initiative draws on non-governmental research and knowledge capabilities (e.g., 
universities, private sector and NGOs). Is there an epistemic community behind the decision? 
Are government experts networking with non-governmental experts? Are the decision makers 
drawing knowledge directly from stakeholders (i.e., value of consultation but also the lobbying 
this entails) or hiring knowledge (consultants) or are they simply using in-house expertise? Is 
there an opportunity for epistemic communities and the public at large to question or peer review 
the science made available? 
 
From a pragmatic perspective, it is important to ask how knowledge is made available to 
the decision-maker. It is difficult for decision-makers to deal with scientific uncertainty, 
information shrouded in jargon, or information presented in an unusable manner. Scientists may 
be specialists, but managers are generalists. Also, the relationship between science and 
management is not an easy one, as science may not always produce the definitive answers that 
administrators and their political masters seek. In turn, scientists are fiercely independent and 




What should be considered here is a policy decision and the policy framework within which it 
occurs. There are various policy factors that may facilitate or constrain ICOM both at the 
development stage (policy-making process) and in the substantive content (the decision). Miles 
defined policy as “a purposive course of action,” suggesting a rationalised decision in view of 
achieving stated ends.17 Policy must convey its purpose and the action foreseen sufficiently 
clearly as not to leave ambiguity of expectations. Clarity, consistency, predictability and equity 
are important criteria. The content must withstand at least a prima facie probing analysis. There 
should be benefits ensuing which are justified by the costs (socio-economic, ecosystemic) to be 
incurred. There is no objective standard. What is important is that the decision is justifiable 
according to an identifiable set of values, interests or policy promises, and that those that decide 
are held accountable.  Relevant questions to be posed should relate to the degree of politicization 
of a decision, the extent to which diversity is reflected, the extent of integration or sectoralization 
in the circumstances, targets of the decision, the relationship of the policy decision to other 
                                                 
17 Edward L. Miles, “Concepts, Approaches and Applications in Sea Use Planning and 




policies (coordination of left and right hands; degree of complementarity or conflict), resource 
commitments, intended effect (e.g., allocation, distribution, organization, etc.) and 
accountability. 
 
The policy rationalization process is influenced by values or beliefs held by the decision-
maker and interests that are actively pursued. In assessing ICOM initiatives it is useful to enquire 
whose interests are driving the policy development process and in whose interests is the final 
decision made. This is relevant because the integrated approach implies an inclusive approach, 
and the policy decision made is necessarily rationalised on the basis of the diversity of interests. 
A policy decision that is particular rather than general can be expected to be more exclusive than 
inclusive in the interests captured. Thus where the context is characterised by diversity, the 
interests of diversity cannot be served and integration cannot be achieved through an exclusive 
approach. This is not to say that sectorally-based or oriented decisions are necessarily 
problematic, but rather that decisions that purport to be integrated ought to be looked at 
differently from those that are not. Therefore what are the underlying values and interests, 
whether a particular initiative is inclusive or exclusive, and to what extent, should be pertinent 
questions. 
 
Efficiency should be a criterion to determine the performance of a policy decision.18 
Policy-making in a federal system necessarily occurs at different levels of government as well as 
in different sectors, frequently in a parallel manner. When policy-making at different levels 
occurs without cross-referencing, a lack of efficiency and possibly also a lack of effectiveness 
can be expected. This is so because resources, especially limited resources (whether human or 
material), cannot be said to be used efficiently if duplication occurs and objectives are reached at 
a higher overall cost, irrespective of whether duplication occurs as a matter of right, principle or 
simple competition. 
 
ICOM policy-making occurs within a larger governance and socio-economic framework. 
Accordingly, it is to be expected that there will be a relationship with other policy-making 
processes, frequently elbowing for attention and resources, at times complementing and at other 
times competing with other processes. The ICOM process can be negatively or positively 
influenced by extraneous factors, and likewise affect other processes. The presence and degree of 
influence or spill-over of other decision-making processes, such as trade and energy, can be vital 
to explain why a particular ICOM process is driven by shipping and/or offshore development. 
This poses a challenge for the integrated approach as it may well be that it is the consequence, 
rather than the cause of a coastal and ocean management challenge that may have to be 
addressed, and in itself this poses limits to integration. 
 
                                                 




Finally, the policy-making process occurs in context and rarely is this static. Thus 
fisheries management in Canada in the 1990s faced massive stock collapses, loss of livelihoods 
and displacement of coastal communities, and the ensuing decisions had to reflect the ecological, 
political, economic and social crises. Coastal and marine resource allocation must take into 
consideration the context of aboriginal rights. In the 1990s the privatization drive resulted in 
significant change in the institutional framework for shipping, and ostensibly what was supposed 
to result in integration of ocean management functions resulted in fragmentation of maritime 
administration functions. Contextual pressures significantly influenced policy-making. The 
lessons of the 1990s and into this millennium in Canada suggest that ICOM prospects may be 




There are various legal factors that influence ICOM in Canada, several of which draw on 
Canada’s federal character, the consequent division of powers in a historical context, and its 
international obligations. The legal factors considered are proposed as related classes of issues, 
namely property and jurisdiction, aboriginal rights, statutory schemes (federal and provincial) 
and applicable international law. 
 
Federal and provincial property and jurisdiction 
 
The first factor concerns Canadian maritime zones and related authority that can be exercised 
over ocean areas in the international law of the sea. This is a facilitating factor for ICOM because 
it produces a certain degree of certainty for Canada’s maritime claims in the eyes of the 
international community. Although Canada is not yet a party to the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UN Convention) it has in effect legislated through Part I of the Oceans Act and earlier 
statutes almost all maritime zone entitlements under that treaty.19 Canada has an extensive 
system of straight baselines in the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific oceans that captures extensive 
inshore waters as Canadian territory.20 In the past, Canada also claimed many bays on all three 
oceans as historic bays, mostly without protest from other maritime powers.21 Modern maritime 
zone claims include a 12M territorial sea, a 24M contiguous zone, a 200M exclusive economic 
                                                 
19 The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea with Annexes and Index (New York: United Nations, 1983), 1-157. 
20 The Oceans Act, note above, s. 5-6, provides for straight baseline delineation by 
regulation: Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates Order, C.R.C., c. 1550; Territorial Sea 
Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, S.O.R./85-872. 
21 Opinion expressed by the Legal Bureau, Department of External Affairs (at the time), 
reproduced in 12 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 277-279 (1974). In the past the 





zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf.22 Although the full seaward limits of the first three have been 
determined, the outer limits of the continental shelf have not yet been determined. Given the 
broad margin character of Canada’s potential claim at least in the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, the 
lack of a seaward limit at this time can be expected to constrain the full exercise of continental 
shelf rights and responsibilities in this maritime zone possibly both in relation to non-living 
resources and sedentary species. 
 
The extent of Canadian authority over the various maritime zones is highly variable. 
Internal waters and the territorial sea are subject to sovereignty, in effect entailing the exercise of 
the totality of jurisdictions and powers that may be exercised on land, subject to the international 
right of innocent passage as a constraint. The contiguous zone permits the exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary purposes. For instance, 
Canada has the right to turn away or apprehend ships that may carry illegal immigrants. In reality 
this power is constrained by humanitarian considerations and the frequent lack of seaworthiness 
of rogue ships.23 The EEZ provides sovereign rights over natural resources, exclusive rights over 
other economic activities and jurisdiction for environment, marine science, artificial islands and 
installations purposes. The overall constraint in this maritime zone relates to the specificity of the 
existing rights. In practice, however, Canada has provided for the application of federal and 
provincial laws over offshore activities.24 The continental shelf within 200M (i.e., co-extensively 
with the EEZ) poses no special issues. It is outside 200M and up to as yet the undefined outer 
limits of the continental margin that Canada has a potential constraint to its sovereign rights over 
natural resources (including sedentary species). In this “outer” continental shelf area, offshore 
mineral activities will potentially be subject to an international tax payable to the International 
Seabed Authority.25 At the same time, the exercise of rights over sedentary species (the only 
living resources tied to the continental shelf regime) may enable Canada to protect the seabed 
and subsoil habitats of such species outside the 200M limit.26 
                                                 
22 Oceans Act, note above, ss. 4, 10, 13 and 17. 
23 “Smuggling Chinese Immigrants into Canada called Big Business,” CNN.Com, 13 
January 2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/01/13/canada.smuggling/ (Accessed 
28 October 2002). 
24 Oceans Act, note above, s. 21. The only such extension of provincial law under this act 
is with reference to the Confederation Bridge Area Provincial (P.E.I.) Law Application 
Regulations, S.O.R./97-375. See also Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation 
Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3, s. 152 extends the application of provincial health, safety and labour law to 
the offshore; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, 
S.C. 1988, c.28, s. 157 makes a similar extension. 
25 UN Convention, note above, Article 86. 
26 Ibid., s. 77(4). In the EEZ the right and duty to conserve is stated in article 61. 




   At a sub-national level, there is an ongoing constraint in terms of provincial claims to 
maritime property rights as distinct from federal prerogatives over jurisdiction. For the most part, 
the federal government (as “Canada”) exercises the rights and duties of a coastal state in the law 
of the sea.27 Maritime areas are generally deemed to be “extra-territorial” and therefore prima 
facie are subject to this national level of authority. However, this has not discouraged some 
provinces from testing their claims over various maritime areas. British Columbia does not enjoy 
a territorial sea but has property over the waters, seabed and subsoil of the area enclosed between 
Vancouver Island and the mainland.28 Newfoundland probably has a territorial sea of three 
nautical miles, but not a continental shelf.29 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have not judicially 
tested their longstanding and pre-confederation claims in the Bay of Fundy.30 Nova Scotia has on 
occasion reminded the federal government that Sable Island is part of the province. Nova Scotia 
has strong grounds for a legal claim on historic grounds to maritime areas off its Atlantic 
shores.31 On different occasions in the past, provincial courts have exercised jurisdiction over 
causes of actions in bays.32 
                                                                                                                                                             
to explore and exploit sedentary species outside 200M in s. 77(4) should be read against Article 
193, which provides that state parties to the UN Convention have a right to develop their natural 
resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.  
27 Oceans Act, note above, s. 7, 8, 15 and 19. 
28 Reference Re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] 
S.C.R. 792; Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas, 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 388. 
29 Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf (1983), 
145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.); Reference Re Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf 
Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.  
30 For a discussion of potential entitlements of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, see: G. 
V. La Forest, “Canadian Inland Waters of the Atlantic Provinces and the Bay of Fundy Incident,” 
1 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 149-171 (1963); G.V. La Forest, “The Delimitation 
of National Territory: Re Dominion Coal Company and County of Cape Breton,” 2 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 233-244 (1964); E. C. Foley, “Nova Scotia’s Case for Coastal 
and Offshore Resources,” 13 Ottawa Law Review 281-308 (1982). 
31 Foley, ibid. at 308. For the purposes of offshore development “Nova Scotia lands” 
include “the land mass of Nova Scotia including Sable Island, and includes the seabed and 
subsoil off the shore of the land mass of Nova Scotia, the seabed and subsoil of the Continental 
shelf and slope and the seabed and subsoil seaward from the Continental shelf and slope to the 
limit of exploitability. Petroleum Resources Act, R.S., c. 342, s. 7. 





The constitutional law of Canada and case law do not effectively settle property and 
jurisdictional issues. The Constitution Act, 1867 allocated extra-territorial matters, fisheries, 
navigation and shipping to the federal government, whereas property and civil rights were 
allocated to the provincial governments.33 At the same time, the property boundaries of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick were protected as at the time of confederation, suggesting that 
whatever these provinces brought into confederation by way of property is still protected today.34   
In practice, although provincial perceptions have tended to constrain federal initiatives in 
ICOM, both governments have approached their differences in a pragmatic and functional 
approach and situation by situation. This has enabled ocean development to proceed while 
provincial claims remained unaffected. Two examples of this concern offshore development and 
aquaculture. Following the Newfoundland Offshore Reference,35 the federal, Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia governments entered into political offshore accords which were legislated 
concurrently at both federal and provincial levels.36 In aquaculture, the federal government 
concluded agreements with several provincial governments that in effect recognize the 




                                                                                                                                                             
other bays in Newfoundland,  Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Co. (1877), 2 
App. Cas. 394 (P.C.); re Bay of Chaleurs, Mowat v. McPhee (1880), 5. S.C.R. 66; re Mahone 
Bay, N.S., King v. Conrad (1938), 12 M.P.R. 588 (N.S.C.A.). A case to the contrary in relation 
to Spanish Bay, Cape Breton, was Re Dominion Coal Co. and County of Cape Breton (1963), 40 
D.L.R. (2d) 593 (N.S.C.A.). 
33 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 91 (federal powers) and 92 (provincial powers). 
34 Ibid., s. 33. 
35 Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland 
(1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.). 
36 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation (Newfoundland) Act, R.S.N. 
1990, c. C-2; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova 
Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3. 
37 See the Federal Aquaculture Development Strategy, http://ocad-bcda.gc.ca/eaqu_e.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2002). For instance Nova Scotia and DFO have had a series of aquaculture 
development agreements since March 1986. The current agreement was renewed recently. See 
“Thibault and Fage Renew Canada/Nova Scotia Memorandum of Understanding on Aquaculture 
Development,” DFO News Release, 18 June 2002, www.ncv.dfo.ca/media/newsreel/2002 









As seen earlier, aboriginal rights are increasingly finding constitutional protection. While on the 
one hand these rights can be seen as a type of encumbrance on the Crown, their full extent 
remains uncertain. One view is that such rights attach to Crown title wherever that title may be 
asserted.38 Also unclear is the potential outcome of differences between the federal government’s 
regulatory conservation authority and aboriginal groups that claim a right to manage a resource 
as part of their aboriginal rights. However, an indication as to the disposition of the federal 
government to address the right of aboriginal peoples to share benefits in non-living, in addition 
to living resources can be found in the recent agreement between the Department of Indian and 
Northern Development and Quebec’s Inuit.39 
 
Statutory schemes (federal and provincial) 
 
Federal and provincial statutory schemes may also facilitate or constrain ICOM. The most 
important federal statute in support of ICOM is clearly the Oceans Act. Divided into three parts, 
this act defines the maritime zones of Canada, provides for integrated management and allocates 
powers, duties and functions to DFO. This act provides a general authority to lead and facilitate 
ICOM to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The act is a type of “constitution” for 
Canada’s ocean space and as a result much of it is declaratory, organizational and norm-setting at 
a level of generality. 
 
Despite its comprehensiveness, the act does not cover all relevant factors for ICOM. In 
fact what is not covered by the act is arguably as important as what is covered. A significant 
potential constraint to integrated coastal management is the exclusion of rivers and lakes, and by 
implication watersheds.40 The full extent of application to terrestrial areas is also questionable, 
                                                 
38 Bernd Christmas, Chief Executive Officer, Membertou, “Overview of the Legal 
Challenges Facing Land and Maritime Claims of the Mi’Kmaq,” a public lecture delivered in the 
Marine and Environmental Law Programme Lecture Series, Dalhousie Law School, 1 November 
2001. 
39 Signed on 24 October 2002, this agreement is the first such agreement in Canada. The 
Nunavik Inuit will be sharing royalties from any oil, gas and precious stone discoveries, as well 
as proceeds from fisheries development. The agreement also gives the Inuit 80% of the Nunavik 
islands and interconnecting waters in the Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait and Ungava Bay, all in all 
amounting to 250,000 square kilometres. “Inuit Royalities Deal a First for Ottawa: Quebec 
Natives to Share Proceeds of Offshore resources,” National Post, 26 October 2002. 




despite a reference to integrated management plans for “all activities or measures in or affecting 
estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters (emphasis added).”41 For integrated coastal 
management purposes, this is an obvious contradiction in the legislation. Federal initiatives 
under this act would have to find creative ways how to apply integrated management plans to the 
“land” component of the land-sea interface. The application of such initiatives to rivers and lakes 
would have to be orchestrated under the authority of other legislation.42 
 
The act is primarily framework legislation and to date contains no new subsidiary 
legislation other than what was imported from the statutes that it now supersedes. Stakeholders 
have perceived this absence of new regulation as a weakness and the Standing Committee has in 
fact recommended the adoption of regulations.43 
 
Beyond the Oceans Act and federal and provincial environmental protection acts lies a 
myriad of federal and provincial sectoral legislation. This legislation establishes mandates for 
coasts and oceans related concerns that interact with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ 
lead role in ICOM. Occasionally, there is at least implicit, if not explicit conflict or lack of 
complementarity between sectorally allocated powers and the integrationist role of the lead 
agency. This has the potential of constraining ICOM. For instance, the Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, the Department of the Environment (Canadian Wildlife Service) and Parks Agency 
have mandates for the establishment of protected areas, although under different names.44 The 
Department of Transport is the maritime administration of Canada, but the Canadian Coast 
Guard (CCG) is part of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.45 Culturally and functionally 
(because of the shipping and navigation concerns), the CCG is naturally closer to the Department 
of Transport (which still hosts marine institutions such as the Marine Safety and Ports and 
                                                 
41 Ibid., s. 31. Through text (“for greater certainty”) and its location as the first section of 
Part II In s. 28, the legislator has chosen to remove any uncertainty regarding the exclusion of 
rivers and lakes. 
42 For instance, specific matters such as water quality, vessel-source pollution and illegal 
fishing matters in inland waters could be addressed through the Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. C-11, Canadian Environment Protection Act (CEPA), 1999, S.C. 1999, c.33, Fisheries Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, and Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9.  
43 Recommendation 1, SCFO Fourth Report, note above. 
44 DFO: Oceans Act, note above, s. 35; Canadian Wildlife Service: Canada Wildlife Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. W-9; Parks Agency: National Parks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-14. The three 
institutions are cooperating to harmonize approaches. 
45 Prior to the Oceans Act the Canadian Coast Guard was part of the Department of 




Harbours) than to its current institutional home.46 The Nova Scotia and Newfoundland offshore 
petroleum boards have separate federal and provincial statutory authority to grant offshore 
licences, set conditions for the conduct of exploration and development activities, and this can 
result in actual overlaps between offshore uses and other uses licenced or serviced, and protected 
areas established by other departments under other statutory authority. The shipping legislation 
does not fully apply to offshore activities.47 Likewise, water quality criteria for discharges into 
the marine environment are different for offshore activities and shipping. 
 
As a result, there are overlaps of statutory mandates between some statutes and the 
mandates performed by the bodies concerned and inconsistencies in regulatory standards for 
different users of the marine environment, even in the same area. These legislative factors can be 
expected to potentially constrain ICOM. 
 
Interdepartmental conflict resolution mechanisms are not necessarily legislated. 
Interdepartmental overlaps in mandates and consequent turfing may be addressed through 
memoranda of agreement or joint committees designed to harmonize or dovetail efforts. For 
instance, the pursuit of overlapping mandates for the establishment of protected areas of the 
bodies referred to above has been addressed through such an instrument.48 
 
Applicable international law and policy 
 
International law is increasingly playing a significant role in informing and guiding Canada’s 
domestic legal system. Canada is party to numerous ICOM-relevant treaties and these are 
implemented through federal statutes.49 Canada has also implemented treaties which it generally 
                                                 
46 Aldo Chircop, Hugh Kindred, Phillip Saunders and David VanderZwaag, “Legislating 
for Integrated Marine Management: Canada’s Proposed Oceans Act of 1996,” 33 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 305-331 (1995), at 323. 
47 For instance important provisions on limitation of liability for maritime claims and oil 
pollution compensation respectively do not apply to floating platforms for non-living resource 
exploration and development and vessels undertaking on site exploration or exploitation of 
hydrocarbons. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6, ss. 25 and 49. 
48 See Working Together for Marine Protected Areas: A National Approach (Ottawa: 
Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceanscanada/newenglish/library/wtogether/wtogeth.html (accessed 4 
November 2002). 
49 For example the CEPA, note above, implements, among others, the Basel Convention 
on the Control of  Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989, 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH937.txt (accessed on 30 October 2002); and the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 




supports, but is not necessarily a formal party to.50 There is also international customary law 
which applies in Canada without necessarily being legislated through a statutory scheme.51 The 
relevance of international law is the existence of international standards which Canadian courts 
have invoked in interpreting and applying law consistently with Canada’s international 
obligations.52 The factor to be weighed here is the existence or otherwise of international law that 
should inform and guide a particular ICOM initiative and whether such initiative is consistent 






There is a wide variety of institutional actors, both in terms of the mantle of authority they bear, 
the function they perform and the interests they represent. The principal concern here is with 
governmental actors. The range of governmental actors is extensive: cabinets, ministries, 
departments, agencies and inter-ministerial/departmental committees. Authoritative actors in 
Canada are located in federal, provincial and municipal53 levels of government, aboriginal 
government, and in some cases of delegation (e.g., through boards or tribunals) or privatization, 
crown corporations and private sector bodies. Also relevant are parliamentary and provincial 
legislature committees which may have an indirect role to play, such as the Standing Committee 
for Fisheries and Oceans which conducts periodic reviews of the Oceans Act and its 
implementation. Another potentially significant player is the court of law, which by facilitating 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Accessed on 26 November 2001). 
50 The UN Convention, note above, is a case in point. The maritime zones in the UN 
Convention have been implemented in the Oceans Act, note above, although Canada is not yet a 
party. 
51 For instance the international customary right of ships in distress has been applied by 
Canadian courts. “It is a well-recognized principle, supported by the jurisprudence as well as by 
the opinions of authors on international law, that a ship, compelled through stress of weather, 
duress or other unavoidable cause to put into a foreign port, is, on grounds of comity, exempt 
from liability to the penalties or forfeitures which, had she entered the port voluntarily, she 
would have incurred.” Cashin v. Canada, [1935] Ex. C. R. 103. 
52 This is the case in a wide variety of settings. See for instance; Suresh v. Canada, 
[2002] S.C.C. 1, File No.: 27790; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Baker v. Canada, 
[1999] 2. S.C.R. 817. 
53 In Canada municipalities are creations of provincial governments. They have powers 
that are centrally relevant for integrated coastal management, such as the power to zone, 




dispute settlement or clarifying the import of a particular law can have far-reaching influence on 
ICOM. Through the Marshall decision the Supreme Court of Canada has had a far-reaching 
impact on aboriginal rights in resource matters. Likewise, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
Canadian maritime law has significantly curtailed a widespread practice of judicial application of 
provincial private law in a maritime setting.54 A key question to be asked in relation to 
authoritative decision makers is who is driving, leading, facilitating or constraining an ICOM 
initiative, and why.  
Authoritative actors have a legal mandate to perform, are subject to political and 
bureaucratic pressures, and can be targets for criticism or be perceived as sources of benefits. 
The manner through which they react to these pressures can significantly facilitate or constrain 
their ability to perform their mandates. For instance, significant criticism of the first version of 
the Oceans Act as a bill forced some reconsideration and re-introduction as an improved bill.55 
Similarly, the significant public criticism of the Oceans Strategy discussion paper probably led to 
its five-year “freeze” until the actual strategy was released in 2002.56 
 
Although not possessing authoritative decision-making power, non-governmental 
organizations may play important roles in screening decision-making in the interests of 
accountability, the projection of particular interests, in partnership with decision-makers, 
dissemination of information and public education. Organized communities, whether working 
through NGOs or through an incorporated body, may also share local authoritative decision-
making in partnership with a level of government through co-management initiatives. The 
contributions of such organizations in shaping a particular ICOM initiative, peer reviewing it or 
in promoting accountability should be identified. 
 
As institutional actors industry stakeholders act to influence, pressure or lobby 
authoritative decision makers in pursuit of particular interests. For instance when the federal 
government acted to privatize contingency planning response services to ships, over 30 
objections were registered and in turn these led to the establishment of a federal commission to 
enquire into the basis of fees for such services.57 
 
Nature and clarity of ICOM mandates  
                                                 
54 On this subject see “Chapter 3: Admiralty Jurisdiction,” in Edgar Gold, Aldo Chircop 
and Hugh Kindred, Canadian Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, forthcoming in 2003). 
55 See for instance the commentary in Chircop et al., note above. 
56 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Toward Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Discussion Paper 
(Ottawa: Communications Directorate, 1997). 
57 Edgar Gold (Chair), John Gratwick, and Peter Yee, Canadian Oil Spill Response 
Capability: An Investigation of the Proposed Fee Regime: Final Report (Ottawa: Fisheries & 





Controversial or unclear ICOM mandates can give rise to resistance or conflicting expectations 
between lead and other actors. Mandates can be expected to be either formal, in the sense of an 
authoritatively assigned power, or informal where in the absence of a specific allocation a power 
may be assumed or expected to be assumed by a concerned actor. 
Perhaps the most important role belongs to the DFO, which is designated as the lead 
agency for ICOM in Canada. At the same time, the DFO has the power to assume non-
designated responsibilities over any other ocean matter within federal jurisdiction that is not 
assigned to another minister.58 It must be emphasized that this lead role is with reference to the 
oceans strategy, integrated planning and management and MPAs. Other departments have their 
own separate de jure lead roles in their respective sectors. Hence the recommendation of the 
Standing Committee that “the government affirm that the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans has 
the primary responsibility for all matters relating to the management of Canada’s oceans” could 
only be met with an inevitable government response:”[B]oth the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans and the Oceans Act fully respect the existing mandates, responsibilities and authorities of 
other federal departments and agencies. This is important because nearly every federal 
department or agency has some level of responsibility related to Canada’s oceans, and therefore 
has a legitimate and necessary role to play in the future of oceans management.”59 
 
The DFO (through its minister) “shall lead and facilitate the development and 
implementation of a national strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal and marine 
ecosystems.”60 This broad function in relation to ecosystems is accompanied by a 
complementary function with reference to different types of waters, i.e., “the development and 
implementation of plans for the integrated management of all activities or measures in or 
affecting estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters.”61 The dual role of leader and facilitator in 
both “strategizing” and “planning” is a significant combination of powers that enables the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans to embark on its own initiatives and at the same time assist 
the initiatives of other departments. 
 
The Oceans Act mandate does not provide DFO with a carte blanche for the exercise of 
its powers under the act. First, the powers are actually legal duties, meaning that lack of 
leadership or facilitation by DFO would be at odds with the act. The extent to which inaction is 
legally actionable or simply a matter of political accountability is unclear. The political 
undertone of inaction was well-captured by the Standing Committee in recommending that the 
Minister for Fisheries and Oceans “exercise his role as the minister with overall responsibility for 
                                                 
58 Oceans Act, note above, s. 40. 
59 Recommendation 11, SCFO Fourth Report, supra. 
60 Oceans Act, note above, s. 29. 




the management of Canada’s oceans more proactively.”62  
 
Second, strategies and plans are required to be based on principles of sustainable 
development, integrated management and precaution.63 The ability of these principles to 
facilitate or constrain ministerial activity depends on their definition. In a sense, although in 
general terms, sustainable development and precaution are defined.64 Precaution also benefits 
from further development and application in other statutes and case law. Integration, on the other 
hand, is not defined in any manner and could be problematic in its application.65  The absence or 
high flexibility of definitions is arguably useful for the federal government to launch initiatives 
that are guided only by general norms.  
 
Third, a more significant constraint is the DFO’s duty to cooperate with “other ministers, 
boards and agencies of the Government of Canada, with provincial and territorial governments 
and with affected aboriginal organizations, coastal communities and other persons and bodies, 
including those bodies established under land claims agreements.”66 The duty here is arguably 
more than a duty to consult, and is probably a duty to “collaborate” in the exercise of powers of 
leadership and facilitation. The diversity of actors to be consulted necessarily involves a high 
degree of complexity in communications and interactions leading to decision-making. In fact, 
ICOM initiatives should also be screened to ascertain to what extent, if at all, do they address 
interdepartmental coordination and cooperation in view of a harmonized approach. 
 
The extent to which mandates facilitate or constrain ICOM  has also to be considered 
with reference to the institutional “heritage” of the body concerned.  For instance a long-standing 
criticism of DFO has been the heavy emphasis on fisheries. Even following the coming into 
force of the Oceans Act, where DFO’s mandate received explicit responsibilities and powers for 
“oceans,” the institutional fisheries stigma remained, while at the same time fisheries 
constituencies still lobby for a higher profile for fisheries interests.67 It is suggested that in the 
                                                 
62 Recommendation 12, SCFO Fourth Report, supra. 
63 Oceans Act, note above, s. 30. 
64 “[S]ustainable development, that is, development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs;” “the 
precautionary approach, that is, erring on the side of caution,” ibid. 
65 “[I]ntegrated management of activities in estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters 
that form part of Canada or in which Canada has sovereign rights under international law;” ibid. 
66 Oceans Act, note above, ss. 29 and 31. 
67 See recommendation three which advocates amendment of the Oceans Act “to include 
references to fishermen and fishermen’s organizations in the sections of the act that require the 




eyes of non-fisheries stakeholders this stigma may constitute a constraint for ICOM initiatives as 
it might suggest bias. In this respect, as lead agency for oceans the DFO would need to create a 
delicate balance between, on the one hand the needs and demands of integrated and multi-
sectoral management, and on the other the sectoral aspect of its mandate, i.e., fisheries. Failure to 
create this balance could potentially create conflict of interest in the department’s dual mandate  





The ICOM inquiry should also extend to the different types of behaviour discernible from 
relevant actors. There are those that are inclined towards cooperative or competitive behaviour or 
possibly non-involvement. Cooperation might result from normative expectations, such as the 
expectation of collaboration from the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. Competition is likely the 
result of inter-governmental and bureaucratic turfing. Non-involvement may simply be passivity, 
possibly as a result of disinterest, perceptions of lack of relevance or simply lack of resources to 
commit. 
 
The manner in which decisions are made is important in assessing institutional behaviour. 
The institutional culture is a message unto itself in terms of how meaningful overtures of 
cooperation might turn out to be. For instance, if there is a public expectation of consultation 
before an initiative is launched or decision made, when in fact that does not occur, resistance and 
non-compliance can be expected. The decision to proceed with a consensus based approach at 
the First ESSIM Forum Workshop should be perceived as a significant new way of doing 
business in the Maritimes, possibly resulting in better constituency reception of this initiative 
than others. At the same time, it has raised expectations in terms of how DFO should proceed in 
the future. 
 
It is suggested that cooperation needs to be pursued and be seen to be pursued with an 
inclusive decision-making ethic in order to facilitate ICOM. As noted earlier, integration 
juxtaposes a diversity of interests, both vertically with reference to authoritative decision makers, 





                                                                                                                                                             




Central to governance is a class of factors loosely referred to as participatory processes. They 
may be expressions of participatory rights and expectations and potentially play a very 
significant role in legitimising or constraining ICOM knowledge-building, decision-making, 
implementation and compliance. Aspiration for good governance is increasingly enhancing ways 
to facilitating stakeholder and public participation, beyond mere information and consultation. 
Federal and provincial environmental assessment legislation now provides for public hearings or 
other types of participative processes.68 The intensity of these “participatory processes” is even 
more visible in relation to aboriginal communities, local communities and affected individuals 
who may demand inclusion as a matter of right.  
 
The traditional protection of individual rights (including property rights) through 
principles of natural justice has now evolved into a more far-reaching requirement of procedural 
fairness in most administrative decision-making bodies.69 In particular, there may be legitimate 
expectations that a particular procedure or process be followed because of the expectations 
arising from a statutory scheme, government representations or treaty membership, and 
ultimately the credibility of government.70 In oceans and environmental contexts, this is 
particularly relevant with reference to the DFO’s duty to cooperate and the conduct of hearings 
in an environmental assessment process. 
 
Integration, because of the implied diversity, necessarily suggests an inclusive approach. 
The quantity or quality and timeliness of the inclusion raises questions of equity, or fairness. 
Administrative decision-making which affects individuals or groups in a fundamental manner is 
bound to observe participatory entitlements as a matter of procedural fairness.71 Participatory 
rights have now become very important in the administrative state, and in an ICOM context 
where administrative decisions may grant or take away a licence to hunt or fish or pollute, issue, 
confirm or deny maritime documents, permit a reduction in goods and services provided by an 
                                                 
68 E.g.: Oceans Act, note above, ss. 29 and 31 require the Minister to collaborate with 
governments, aboriginal communities, coastal communities and other persons. Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 1992 S.C. , c. 37, ss. 16(1)(c) re comments of the public are a 
factor to be considered, 18(3) re consideration of public comments, 19(2) re public notice among 
several other public notice requirements, 34 and 35(3) concerning the convening of public 
hearings by a review panel; 55 et seq. Re access to information, and 58(1.1) re participant 
funding. Provincial statutes have similar provisions. For example Nova Scotia’s Environment 
Act, R.S.N.S., 1994-95, c. 1, s. 44 has a public consultation requirement 
69 See David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), especially 147-
175 on the reach of procedural fairness rights.  
70 Ibid., 177-186. See also J.M. Evans et. al., Administrative Law: Cases, Text and 
Materials 4d (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1995), 129-147. 




ecosystem, or facilitate the urbanization of a coastline, among others, it is to be expected that 
those that benefit are likely to be accompanied by those that do not, or worse. It is difficult to 
envisage compliance if the inequity of a decision-making process provokes resistance and 
grievance, and in turn forces costly enforcement or conflict management. Consequently, it is a 
legitimate question to ask to what extent the policy-making process is equitable in the eyes of the 
decision maker and decision receiver at the same time.72 This might help explain in part the 
degree of cooperation or otherwise in an ICOM initiative. 
 
There are various ways how a framework for participation may satisfy equity in the sense 
above: co-management, public hearings or consultations, discussion papers accompanied by 
workshops, etc. There is no limit to the possibilities, but the degree of contextualization of the 
process, the ultimate range and intensity of participation and the sense of satisfaction or non-
objection of stakeholders should be expected to favour some possibilities more than others. The 
key question is whether there is good process in the circumstances. This is a relative test. An 
ICOM initiative should be screened for such processes. 
 
Another pertinent matter is the extent to which an ICOM initiative provides for conflict 
avoidance and management. The diversity implied by the integrated approach and the 
consequent inclusive participation should be expected to provide an opportunity for competing 
interests to influence a decision. Truly inclusive participation may avoid many potential conflicts 
simply by ensuring access and exchange of information to avoid misunderstandings. However, 
there can be situations where differences grounded on values and entrenched interests could 
mature into open conflicts. An ICOM initiative should anticipate this and provide conflict 




ICOM initiatives will entail costs. A development proposal may consume ecosystem goods and 
services. That proposal may also allocate benefits to some, and decrease benefits to others. There 
might be a cost for non-action, or a higher cost associated with one option more than with 
another. There could be opportunity costs. Government may need to appropriate funding in 
support of an initiative. Taxes may need to be levied to fund an initiative, or donations or other 
voluntary allocations made. In all these instances, costs are incurred because an ICOM initiative 
needs to be resourced. In successful ICOM initiatives, the original investment may be multiplied 
as a result of leveraging other resources. This could be evidence of buy-in or ownership by 
stakeholders who recognise the value of the initiative and commit to its continuity by allocating 
more resources. Indeed, this could be an indicator of sustainability. The inverse of this is when 
no resource commitments are made to an initiative, which in turn suggests lack of genuine 
commitment. The absence or insufficiency of resources may stultify an initiative. This could be 
an indicator of lack of sustainability. 
                                                 
72 Miles includes equity as a criterion for evaluation of national ocean management 







An ICOM initiative should also be screened to determine if its design includes a monitoring and 
evaluation process to enable it to measure progress or the lack thereof, and to adjust to lack of 
results, change and unforeseen circumstances.73 As indicated earlier, an effective evaluation 
process needs to start with a reliable set of baselines, performance indicators, critical 
assumptions and clear objectives with targets to be achieved. 
 
Results should be measured in terms of outputs (immediate products), outcomes (short to 
medium-term) and impacts (long-term). There should be indicators which are useful both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. It is suggested that ultimately ICOM should be aiming at 
effectiveness in terms of (a) behavioural change (actual or potential; incentives), (b) impact on 
the environment, economy, health, etc. There will be costs incurred to justify the results; 
accordingly, there should be the possibility of measuring the benefit against the cost, and this 
will indicate level of efficiency. As a matter of good governance, there should be transparency in 
the evaluation process. Ultimately, constituencies have to be satisfied with both process and 
results. 
 
An ICOM initiative that does not carry an in-built quality assurance process cannot be 
usefully measured to determine success or otherwise. 
 
Assessing specific ICOM initiatives 
 
At this point the discussion in this paper moves from the theoretical framework to specific 
integrated management initiatives in Canada. How have the factors presented above facilitated or 
constrained specific federal ICOM initiatives in Canada? 
 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future 
 
The Canadian Federal Government released the long-awaited Canada’s Oceans Strategy 
(Oceans Strategy) in mid-summer 2002,74 five years after the release of the ocean’s strategy 
discussion paper.75 The Oceans Strategy constitutes the policy framework for Canada’s vision 
                                                 
73 Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean 
Management: Concepts and Practices (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 241-248. 
74 Oceans Strategy, ibid. The release of the Oceans Strategy was accompanied by a 
second document: Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, 
Coastal and Marine Environments in Canada  (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002). 





for the management of its ocean space and is likely to be second in importance only to the 
Oceans Act for ICOM in Canada. The strategy goes to some length to assert the importance of 
ocean governance, specifically in terms of inter and intra-governmental collaboration, shared 
responsibility and an inclusive approach to decision-making. Because of its novelty, this 
instrument can only be assessed with reference to the process that generated it and the actual 
content. 
A reading of the Oceans Strategy and the communication documents surrounding its 
release in July 2002, would lead the public to assume that the interest in and preparatory work 
for ICOM in Canada began only in the mid-1990s. There is no reference at all to the significant 
level of cooperative effort that was undertaken from the late1980s through the early 1990s under 
an interdepartmental federal initiative known as Marine Environmental Quality (MEQ).   
 
To understand the genesis of the MEQ one needs to refer to the 1987 Oceans Policy for 
Canada, which recognized that many federal agencies share the responsibility for and must 
cooperate in the maintenance and enhancement of the quality and sustainability of the marine 
environment. In support of this need, an Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO) was 
established to coordinate and guide marine programs and policies at the federal level.76  The ICO 
recognized that coordination at the federal level would be essential and that an overarching 
framework for marine environmental quality would be necessary.  Thus in 1989, the ICO 
established a Director-General level sub-committee to oversee the preparation of a federal MEQ 
framework and action plan. A working group of this DG Sub-committee, co-chaired by 
Environment Canada-Atlantic Region and DFO-Ottawa and composed of federal departments 
and agencies with a stake in the marine environment, was established to lead this process.  
 
In 1992, 17 federal Deputy Ministers/Presidents endorsed a document entitled 
“Framework for the Management of Marine Environmental Quality within the Federal 
Government.”77  Following this endorsement, the ICO Sub-committee further directed the 
Working Group to prepare a federal MEQ Action Plan that would identify interdepartmental 
activities related to the marine environment and that would provide for the overall coordination 
of related policies and programs of the federal government. Once completed, a national MEQ 
framework and action plan would be prepared, as a cooperative effort involving the provinces, 
territories, First Nations, industry, universities and the public. 
!
The federal “Framework” and MEQ Action Plan set out a strategy for the management of 
marine environmental quality in Canada.78  It consists of an overall objective,79 a set of guiding 
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77 Marine Environmental Quality Working Group of the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Oceans, “Framework for the Management of Marine Environmental Quality within the Federal 
Government,” (Ottawa, 1992). 




principles80 and a series of specific goals!and related actions.81  The MEQ Working Group 
stayed active through early 1995 until interdepartmental turfing over proposed transfer of 
resources reached levels that all but eliminated discussion, let alone continuance of any 
collaborative arrangements between EC and DFO.  The MEQ initiative was relegated to oblivion 
and the proposed national MEQ framework and action plan were never pursued. 
!
Even a cursory examination of the MEQ initiative’s principles, objectives, goals and 
proposed actions demonstrate that much of the current ICOM thinking as espoused by DFO was 
anticipated. However, the Oceans Strategy provides no acknowledgment of this important earlier 
                                                                                                                                                             
Oceans, “Federal Framework and Action Plan for Marine Environmental Quality”, (Dartmouth 
and Ottawa, 1994). 
79 To enable Canada to effectively maintain and enhance marine environmental quality.  
This will in turn allow for the sustainable development of Canada’s marine resources and for the 
enjoyment, use and good health of present and future generations and for the restoration, 
conservation, protection and enhancement of natural and cultural marine areas. 
80 The quality of the marine environment is of local, regional, national and global 
importance and is essential for the sustainable development of marine resources; the federal 
government has a national leadership role for the overall conservation and protection of 
Canada’s marine environment, as well as specific statutory responsibilities; the stewardship of 
the marine environment is the shared responsibility of the international community, federal and 
provincial governments, First Nations, and other stakeholders.  Crucial to the achievement of the 
framework’s objective are consultation and collaboration among all stakeholders; the 
maintenance of a healthy marine environment, the support of environmentally-sound economic 
activity, and the provision of environmental services are priorities of the federal government; 
scientific understanding of the marine environment is essential for sound management of marine 
environmental quality; and sound decisions by all levels of Canadian society are based on the 
availability of timely information on issues relevant to the quality of the marine environment. 
81 The federal government has identified nine major goals related to the management of 
marine environmental quality in Canada: honour Canada’s international commitments and 
obligations for the management of oceans; maintain and enhance the marine environment 
through cooperation at national and regional levels with other levels of government, First 
Nations and others; fulfill the federal government’s statutory and regulatory responsibilities in 
relation to the quality of the marine environment; integrate environmental, social and economic 
objectives in marine areas to meet sustainable development; promote safe and environmentally 
sound human activity in marine areas; establish and manage a comprehensive network of marine 
conservation areas, migratory bird sanctuaries and other protected areas; protect human health; 
improve scientific knowledge and understanding of the marine environment and maintain 
appropriate Canadian research, technical and managerial expertise to address marine issues; and 




cooperative work before DFO was designated lead federal department for coasts and oceans by 
the Oceans Act. Two important observations have to be offered in this regard: first, there is loss 
of corporate memory, thus suggesting inefficiency and possibly leading to the proverbial “re-
invention of the wheel;” the second is lack of acknowledgment of other institutions’ 
contributions, which may not bode well for future interdepartmental cooperation which will be 




The initiative of DFO to develop a national oceans strategy is a responsibility conferred on this 
department by the Oceans Act.82 Accordingly, this particular initiative cannot be said to have 
been triggered by an event, but rather constitutes the fulfilment of a legal mandate. Nor can it be 
said, in the view of these authors, that any particular crisis triggered the federal government to 
exercise its own mandate. However, it can be said that the eventual release and content were 
influenced by ongoing public pressure and perceptions of appropriate political timing. The 
release of the Oceans Strategy on the eve of the impending Rio + 10 UN conference in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, is no coincidence, and suggests an opportune forum to showcase 
Canadian oceans expertise. 
 
Problems and baselines 
 
The legal mandate provided to DFO is with reference to a national strategy for the management 
of Canadian estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems. Because of its generality as a 
management framework at a national scale, the strategy does not, and could not, purport to 
address in depth any one problem or class of problems. Rather, it provides a framework to 
address any coastal and ocean problem or issue in existence or that might arise through 
integrated management plans, which are also mandated under the Oceans Act.  
 
Consequently, the Oceans Strategy does not identify any baselines, and could not 
possibly do so. This will necessarily have to be addressed at the level of integrated management 
plans. At the same time however, the federal government has indicated in the Oceans Strategy 
that evaluation will be based on identified performance indicators, possibly to enable results-
based management. Results-based management requires the identification of objectives in the 
form of outputs, outcomes and impacts (change over the short, medium and long-term), the 
achievement of which would be measured against performance indicators, and against a situation 
or conditions at a particular moment in time (physical and temporal reference points). 
 
It is clear that the overall performance of the strategy will be difficult to assess without 
identified baselines, unless the performance of individual integrated management plans and 
MPAs established under the impetus of the strategy will be deemed to constitute the performance 
                                                 








The Oceans Strategy addresses management area concerns at various levels. On a macro policy 
level, the strategy applies to all Canadian coastal and marine environments within national 
jurisdiction. Under certain conditions, it also purports to apply to areas outside national 
jurisdiction. On an operational level, the strategy provides for the identification of two types of 
management areas: (1) large marine ecosystem (large ocean management area, or LOMA); (b) 
coastal management area. Both would be defined in ecosystemic terms and the coastal 
management area would be related to the larger ocean management area.  
 
The strategy emphasizes that the ecosystemic approach may well produce management 
areas that cut across different jurisdictional areas. What the strategy does not anticipate at this 
stage, but should be anticipated in integrated management plans, is that ecosystemic 
“boundaries” are not necessarily permanent, may vary in the case of overlapping ecosystems, 
and may fluctuate over time. This seems to have been anticipated in the case of the Southeast 
Marine Management Plan in Australia.83 In effect, the conscious decision to steer away from 
formalistic jurisdictional boundaries for management areas signifies the arrival of a functionalist 
approach to ocean zoning. There are merits in this approach, but it will live side-by-side, rather 
than displace zoning for sectoral purposes, such as offshore oil and gas exploration, development 
and production licenses. How the two types of zoning, the first for integrated management 
purposes and the second for specific sectoral purposes, interrelate remains to be seen. 
 
There may be limitations to this approach to management area definition. The strategy is 
careful to stipulate an ecosystemic approach or an ecosystem-based approach, and not an 
ecosystem management approach. This is not necessarily a problem-oriented approach, and in 
fact other than the need to identify priorities, there is no hint in the strategy that ICOM in Canada 
will be problem-oriented. The advantage of a problem-oriented approach is that the ecosystemic 
definition of the management area would be more directly related to the area of influence of the 
problem (which might cut across different systems). What should logically result from the 
approach in the strategy is that generalised ecosystems will be identified and then problems 
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The Oceans Strategy is purportedly a knowledge-based instrument drawing from national and 
international experience in ocean management. Knowledge is understood as solid 
multidisciplinary science subject to peer review. This heavy emphasis on marine science is 
accompanied by user knowledge (industry, fisherfolk, local communities) and the traditional 
ecological knowledge of aboriginal communities.84 Perhaps this is where the oceans strategy 
misses the point on integration, in terms of the need for a better understanding of the relationship 
between communities/users and the marine environment. The understanding of human behaviour 
in relation to complex systems will require more than marine science. A notable under-emphasis 
is the role of academic and research institutions operating outside the governmental framework. 
This suggests that the traditional uneasiness of civil servants with the academic establishment 
continues and defeats the expressed intent on integrating knowledge. Moreover, there seems to 
be an implicit assumption that governmental bodies in Canada have the necessary knowledge 
and expertise to undertake the complex integration required in ICOM. Government would 
provide capacity to communities and to the international community, but little attention seems to 
be paid to the need to build capacity within the various levels of government in Canada. 
 
On the plus side, there is an important commitment in the Oceans Strategy to the 
dissemination of knowledge and access to information by stakeholders and participants in 
integrated management plans. This will be essential to levelling the playing field among the 
various actors and facilitate informed and meaningful participation. 
 
Policy factors: decision-making process and content 
  
As noted earlier, the discussion paper that initiated the process leading to the release of the 
Oceans Strategy was first distributed in 1997. The federal government undertook hearings across 
the country and invited public and stakeholder feedback. There were many critical reactions 
which reflected the great diversity among ocean interests in the country and the high 
expectations on the federal government on this initiative. A major weakness at that time and until 
the actual release of the Oceans Strategy was that there was no clearly stated integrated national 
ocean policy in the country. As a result, the discussion paper was perceived as identifying 
potential issues that could be addressed in an oceans management strategy in the absence of 
well-defined objectives. This major weakness has now been addressed: the Oceans Strategy is 
the integrated national ocean policy of Canada. 
 
There was no public release of a sequel to the discussion paper and before the Oceans 
Strategy. The re-thinking occurred within the federal government. In this interim period the 
initiative for regional integrated management planning was well under way and it was in fact 
thought that the learning by doing approach at the regional level would eventually lead to the 
development of a national strategy (bottom-up approach). This period also saw three successive 
ministers for Fisheries and Oceans and the emergence of several issues that hijacked the DFO’s 
attention (e.g., Marshall decision and the Burnt Church crisis in New Brunswick). By 2002, the 
                                                 




federal decision to internally develop the strategy and release it to the public was effectively 
made without further public consultation. To remedy this shortfall in follow-up public 
consultations, the strategy is very careful in advocating an inclusive approach to integrated 
management decision-making. 
 
On the policy content side, the fundamental goal of the strategy is “to ensure healthy, safe 
and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and future generations of Canadians.”85 This 
lofty goal is supported by three major objectives in terms of (1) marine environment protection, 
(2) promotion of sustainable economic opportunities, and (3) the exercise of international 
leadership.86 The pursuit of the goal and objectives is advanced as a principled approach.87 The 
principles advanced are drawn from the Oceans Act, namely sustainable development, integrated 
management and precaution. Although these fall short of the full range of principles stated in the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, several other principles in the latter are 
identified a role in the strategy.88 Thus, ecosystem-based approaches, indigenous knowledge and 
coastal communities have a place and role in the strategy.  
 
Sustainable development is used more as a buzzword than a principle which can have 
truly operational significance. Nothing new is offered in relation to precaution, which is 
advanced both as principle and approach. However, of considerable significance is the federal 
government’s commitment to the “wide application of the precautionary approach to the 
conservation, management and exploitation of marine resources in order to protect these 
resources and preserve the marine environment,” the promotion of an ecosystem-based approach 
to management, application of conservation measures and establishment of MPAs, investing in 
knowledge-building and maintaining ecosystem integrity.89 The Oceans Strategy falls short of 
stipulating more widespread use of environmental impact assessment under federal and 
provincial legislation as a planning tool before development or resource allocation decisions are 
made. It thus remains to be seen to what extent precaution will be widely applied with respect to 
the numerous fisheries of Canada, especially since resource management tends to be on a stock 
basis. Ecosystem science is still in its infancy and virtually every fishery is subject to intense 
political pressure. 
  
                                                 
85 Oceans Strategy, note above, at 10. 
86 Ibid., at 12-18. 
87 Ibid., 10-12. 
88 E.g., the role of coastal communities and aboriginal peoples and their knowledge, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/RIO-DECL.txt (accessed 5 November 2002). 




Much of the Oceans Strategy and the accompanying Policy and Operational Framework 
focusses on integration and the integrated approach, and not surprisingly so given the contextual 
complexity of ICOM in Canada. Integration is defined as a “continuous process through which 
decision-making is made,”90 “a commitment to planning and managing human activities in a 
comprehensive manner while considering all factors ...” and that it includes other principles and 
concepts such as (1) holistic knowledge, information sharing, communication and education, (2) 
inclusive and collaborative structures and processes, (3) flexible and adaptive management as 
knowledge improves and in response to uncertainty, and (4) planning on the basis of a combined 
approach to natural and economic systems.91 There seem to be three major dimensions in its 
application, namely in relation to multiple ocean use planning, the management of the 
relationship between human uses and the environment (ecosystems), and the design and 
implementation of institutional responses. There seems to be a “conflict” bias in this approach to 
integration, in the sense that while conflict avoidance and management are writ large, there 
seems to be no emphasis at all on the promotion of complementarities (e.g., complementary 




The strategy is cautious in dealing with sensitive constitutional issues. There is thus due respect 
paid to: the provinces’ primary responsibility for provincial lands, shoreline and specific seabed 
areas; municipalities’ responsibility for many land-based activities that have an impact on the 
marine environment; and aboriginal rights as recognized and protected by the Constitution Act, 
1982 and treaty rights.93 The strategy also recognizes that the various government bodies have to 
operate within their existing statutory mandates. 
 
It is interesting to note that a stated commitment of Canada is to play an international role 
in ICOM. Canada, a main beneficiary of the UN Convention, recognizes that the “maintenance 
and preservation of sovereignty over national ocean space is ... a fundamental right in 
                                                 
90 Policy and Operational Framework, note above, at 36. 
91 Oceans Strategy, note above, at 11. 
92 See for instance the definition of integrated management:  “A continuous process 
through which decisions are made for the sustainable use, development, and protection of areas 
and resources. IM acknowledges the interrelationships that exist among different uses and the 
environments they potentially affect. It is designed to overcome the fragmentation inherent in a 
sectoral management approach, analyses the implications of development, conflicting uses and 
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among various activities.” Policy and Operational Framework, note above, at 36. 




international law and is a priority for Canada.”94 In this regard, Canada has repeatedly stated its 
intention to become a party to the UN Convention and indeed repeats this commitment in the 
strategy.95 In relation to the transboundary management of straddling stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in particular, Canada continues to use the absence of an effective 
enforcement regime as a reason to stay out of the treaty. Instead of working within the existing 
international legal framework, Canada believes that it can be more effective in regime-building 
by working as an outsider, rather than insider. The authors suggest this continued posturing 
detracts from Canada’s ability to exercise the international leadership it seeks in the strategy, and 





Collaboration between the various governments and within each level of government is 
identified as a core commitment to ocean governance.96 There is recognition that almost every 
federal government department or agency is involved in ICOM in some manner.97 In effect this 
means that over 20 bodies have an interest stemming from their mandates. However, although 
many of these have a strong marine mandate (e.g., Department of Transport and Department of 
the Environment), perhaps only two federal departments have a wide ICOM mandate, whether 
explicitly or implicitly. The first is DFO, which has the explicit lead role in integrated 
management in the Oceans Act. The second is Environment Canada, whose jurisdiction is 
implicit in relation to all activities that have an adverse impact on the marine environment (e.g., 
pollution, wildlife protection). Other departments play a lead role for their particular sector or 
area of marine concern (e.g., Department of National Defence). In the marine transportation area, 
the Department of Transport is the maritime administration of Canada, but the Canadian Coast 
Guard is part of the DFO. Accordingly, it is to be expected that in this sector close cooperation 
between these two departments is necessary.  
 
In the interests of the integrated approach under the strategy, there will need to be 
collaboration and coordination not only among federal bodies, but also with and among 
provincial and municipal governments. At a level of generality, the strategy proposes to use new 
and existing institutional mechanisms such as committees and boards for this purpose.98 Given 
enduring departmental turfing at the federal level and occasional federal-provincial turfing, there 
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is no indication of how the lack of cooperation and occasional competition will in fact be 
addressed. Moreover, line departments do weigh their participation and expected benefits against 
actual costs. The strategy is unclear as to whether and how line departments would be expected 
to shoulder the costs of an integrated management initiative under the lead of another 





According to the strategy “[T]he governance model proposed for integrated management is one 
of collaboration.”99 In addition to governmental cooperation discussed above, the strategy 
foresees broader social participation in three ways. First the process of integrated management 
will result in the establishment of advisory bodies. Although the strategy is silent on their actual 
role and composition, it would seem that the collaborative approach advocated throughout the 
strategy would lead to the inclusion of stakeholders. Second, where an integrated management 
body is created, composition would include governmental and non-governmental persons. 
Stakeholders will play more than an advisory role: “[P]articipants take an active part in 
designing, implementing and monitoring the effectiveness of coastal and ocean management 
plans, and partners enter into agreements on ocean management plans with specific 
responsibilities, powers and obligations.”100 Second, there will be specific situations where co-
management can take place, although this type of management is unnecessarily conceived only 
with reference to aboriginal communities and not to coastal communities generally.101 Given the 
pervasiveness of co-management in many parts of the world and growth in Canada, the strategy 
does not give this form of management much attention or scope of application, and leaves it 
more as a prescription for “specific” cases, rather than promoting it as a more general practice. 
 
An innovation is then attached to stakeholder participation. Integrated management 
bodies (second and third situations above) will not only provide advice, but will “also assume 
responsibility for implementation of the approved management plan.”102 This is consistent with 
the “collaborative” governance approach advocated. How far this will be pursued remains to be 
seen. One experience with privatization of contingency planning and response led a federal 
commission to conclude that there are certain governmental responsibilities (i.e., contingency 
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planning for environment protection) that should not be delegated.103 
 
What the strategy leaves uncertain in relation to these notions of active participation is 
who actually assumes responsibility when a problem arises as a result of the management action 
undertaken. This could be a potential problem in terms of having persons accountable for their 
actions, but at the same encouraging stakeholder participation. At its worst, participants could be 
exposing themselves to potential legal liabilities. In order to address this potential problem, it 
might be necessary  (1) for the federal government to assume full responsibility, including for 
decisions that are not fully its own, or (2) to provide participants with liability exemptions for the 
consequences of decisions of integrated management bodies; or (3) to incorporate integrated 
management bodies. The impression given by the strategy is that this potential problem has not 
been given sufficient attention. 
 
The Oceans Act already went to great lengths in establishing a duty to consult on DFO. 
The Oceans Strategy goes much further in developing, in a Canadian administrative law context, 
a legitimate expectation for stakeholders to demand that the federal government live up to the 
stated policy for an inclusive process in decision-making. Although the strategy does note that 
there will be occasions when consensus might not be possible, there is no turning back to the 
dirigisme that was the case in the past. ICOM decisions might be judicially reviewable if 




The Oceans Strategy is silent on costs of implementation and the resources needed. Currently, it 
has no separate budgetary allocation, and it is expected that elements of the strategy would be 
pursued in the context of current departmental programming and funding. The major challenge 
that the multi-sectoral strategy faces, and will continue to face, is how to receive a fairer share of 
a decreasing departmental budget which is still dominantly oriented towards sectoral concerns. 
Examples of activities that could be comprehended by the strategy over a four-year period (with 
no indication as to start date) are given. Some of these require doing current business in new 
ways, suggesting that the activities could be pursued within current sectoral programming and 




The strategy is conceived as an iterative or “rolling” strategy that would be updated on an 
ongoing basis as a result of knowledge gained and lessons learned from adaptive management. 
The strategy stresses the importance of measuring progress, relevance and effectiveness, but does 
not suggest ways how this might be done. This has great value for what is in effect a 
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management experiment. In order to do this it will be necessary to have a sophisticated 
evaluation process which currently does not exist. Such an evaluation process would need to 
integrate results-based management principles and approaches discussed earlier, and factor-in the 
introduction of change while the strategy is still being assessed against stated performance 
indicators. Change that is introduced on an ongoing basis is likely to make it difficult to measure 
strategy performance, especially if there is also change in performance indicators. 
 
Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) initiative 
 
The Oceans Act mandates the DFO to lead and facilitate the development and implementation of 
integrated management plans (IMPs).105 To date, no one IMP has been established although there 
are integrated management initiatives under way on the three oceans of Canada.106 ESSIM is one 
such initiative under federal leadership and covers a large part of the marine area off the Atlantic 
coast of Nova Scotia. This will be the focus of this part of the paper, but since ESSIM is in fieri 
in statu nascendi, the analysis provided below must be considered provisional. This provisional 
analysis is useful in that this initiative already provides valuable insights into the emerging trends 
and practices of integrated management in Canada. There are similar DFO initiatives for the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence and Pacific Ocean. Another major initiative for integrated planning is in the 
Arctic (Beaufort Sea), but it antecedes the Oceans Act.107 Of all these initiatives, ESSIM covers 
the most extensive management area, has the largest number of participants of any Canadian 
integrated management initiative to date, “while at the same time providing an important national 
policy roadmap for future oceans management.”108 
   
Trigger 
 
Consequent to the DFO’s Oceans Act mandate to lead and facilitate the development of 
integrated management plans, ESSIM has at least a legislative trigger. However, this on its own 
does not fully explain why it was this area of the Atlantic region, and not another among several 
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1999 there have been as many as 18 integrated management pilot projects on the three coasts. 
See keynote address by King, “Canadian Oceans Management,” in S. Coffen-Smout et al., eds., 
Proceedings of the 1st Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) Forum Workshop, 
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Aquatic Sciences 2604 (Halifax: DFO, 2002), at 57. 
107 Beaufort Sea Integrated Management Planning Initiative (BSIMPI) traces back its 
origins to the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in 1984 and which set up a resource co-management 
arrangement. 




candidates, that became the first such initiative in this part of the country. Of particular relevance 
to the genesis of this initiative is public concern over perceived threats to the rich marine life in 
and over a submarine canyon on the Eastern Scotian Shelf known as the Gully. Much of the 
Scotian shelf is covered by exploration licenses, mostly for gas. There are numerous other 
marine uses off Nova Scotia that are occasionally in conflict with one another, and most 
especially in conflict with fishing as the oldest and most widespread use of the area. These 
spatial interactions often result in uneasy relationships among coastal communities and between 
these communities and offshore developers. 
 
Sable Island is located close to the Gully and is subject to conservation and management 
by the Sable Island Preservation Trust.109 The Gully and its waters will be subjected to a separate 
regime of protection. Mounting conservation concerns had prodded the federal government to 
declare the Gully as an area of interest as a marine protected area and the adoption of the Sable 
Gully Conservation Strategy in 1997. This strategy recommended the initiation of integrated 
ocean management with an offshore focus in this area.110 The Oceans Act also tasked DFO with 
the leadership and coordination of the development and implementation of a national system of 
marine protected areas for the purpose of integrated management planning in Canada.111 
 
Problems and baselines 
 
Although there are several actual or potential problems (e.g., conflicts between submarine cables 
and fishing in the same area; offshore oil and gas licencing and conservation concerns; etc.) the 
ESSIM initiative to date has not yet focussed on any one problem or problems (actual or 
potential). The initiative will eventually address both long and short-term objectives. It has been 
recognized that there should be prioritization of specific issues for immediate action. In effect, 
although the initiative has been triggered by perceived problems as well as a legislative mandate, 
the overall direction of the initiative is not problem-oriented. Actual problem definition is left for 
later. The key elements set out for an integrated management plan rely heavily on the definition 
of an area and within it eventually the identification of actual issues to be the subject of 
integrated management planning.112 Criteria for the inclusion of issues in the IMP have been 
anticipated, and namely “(i) an issue that could involve multiple oceans use with social/economic 
benefits (i.e., inter-sectoral spatial and temporal conflicts); or (ii) activities that could result in 
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Service, Atlantic Region, 1998), http://www.ns.ec.gc.ca/reports/pdf/sable.pdf (accessed 3 
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ecosystem impacts.”113 A concern with an issue-based approach in the future is that this might 
not enable proactive planning, but rather continue an issue-oriented response that has been much 
criticized in the past. ESSIM will need to hold a steady course and be able to operate at two 
levels, without one level derailing the other: the first should be medium to long-term planning 
and management objectives, and the second should be responsiveness to immediate problems, 




It will be recalled that the Oceans Strategy provides for management at both large and small 
scales (LOMA, such as ESSIM; and coastal management areas yet to be initiated) and that these 
will draw from a mix of ecological and administrative criteria.114 The management area is 
perhaps one of the most unclear matters in the ESSIM initiative. At approximately 325,000 
square kilometres, it covers only half of the Scotian Shelf. On the one hand the Oceans Strategy 
asserts that integrated management plans will be driven by ecosystem-based approaches. On the 
other hand, the definition of the ESSIM management area has very little ecosystemic basis and 
the marine space that will be encompassed is uncertain and confusing. The area currently 
covered by the initiative seems to have been inspired by various factors, mostly jurisdictional or 
administrative, and hardly any of which have any ecosystemic relevance.   
 
First, if a large marine ecosystem were to be identified in the area, it would have to 
encompass the entire Scotian Shelf, whereas only the eastern part of the shelf is included in the 
initiative.115 The DFO has identified natural divisions,116 but these have been questioned. 
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corresponds to an offshore ecozone based on oceanographic and bathymetric features. The Area 
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with wide banks and the shelf break; and (iv) the continental slope and oceanic waters. Based on 
oceanographic conditions, such as currents, salinity and temperature regimes, a natural division 
is recognized between the eastern/central and western part of the Scotian Shelf (i.e., west of 





Second, the actual area coincides with an administratively defined fishing zone: NAFO 
divisions 4VW, bordered by 4WX to the west and 4V to the east.117 This suggests that fishery 
interests dominated the first cut at the management area and raises a fundamental question 
whether a sectoral boundary is useful for a multi-sectoral ecosystemic task. 
 
Third, the eastern boundary coincided with the former Newfoundland-Nova Scotia 
offshore boundary, pursuant to the federal offshore accord legislation with the two provinces. 
This defined the limits of offshore licensing by the two federal-provincial offshore boards and 
thus provided some convenience.118 To complicate the jurisdictional matter this boundary has 
now been reviewed by an arbitration tribunal, and there is a new boundary which is considerably 
closer to Sable Island (to Nova Scotia’s disadvantage!).119 This raises a question as to the eastern 
limit of the ESSIM as a significant part of the management area now falls within 
Newfoundland’s offshore instead.  
 
Fourth, the ESSIM area excludes the territorial sea (a 12M belt along the coast), and there 
does not seem to be provision for inclusion of the important territorial sea around Sable Island.120 
Although the stated intention of ESSIM is to address the offshore, the exclusion of the key 
territorial sea area will exclude a range of activities that have a significant impact on the Scotian 
Shelf ecosystem and which in effect are also a springboard for offshore activities. There is very 
little human activity in the ESSIM area which does not emanate from the coastal zone. Divorcing 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Dartmouth: DFO/Oceans and Coastal Management Division, November 2001), at 10. In 
response to this, several participants (including DFO) at the 1st ESSIM workshop expressed the 
view that the proposed ESSIM boundaries carried an element of superficiality and did not reflect 
ecological concerns. See Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM Forum, note above, at 5-6, 14, 20, 31, 45. 
117 See Development of Collaborative and Management Process, note above, at 9. 
118 Schedule 1, Canada-Nova Scotia Accord Act, note above, Schedule 1. The 
Newfoundland counterpart does not contain such a precise and detailed definition of the offshore 
area. 
119 Arbitration Between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia Concerning 
Portions of the Limits of Their Offshore Areas as Defined in the Canada-Nova Scotia 
OffshorePetroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and the Canada-Newfoundland 
Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, Award of the Tribunal in the Second Phase, Ottawa, March 
26, 2002, http://www.boundary-dispute.ca/#Anchor-29754 (accessed 28 October 2002), paras. 
4.32-4.36, 5.13-5.15. This award will probably necessitate an amendment to the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Accord, note above, Schedule 1 definition of the boundary between this province and 
Newfoundland. 




the offshore from the inshore defeats the rationale and purposes of the integrated approach, 
which normally requires consideration of the full range of interacting activities and cumulative 
impact (cause-effect relationships) on the ecosystem. One reason put forward is that the impact 
of land-based activities on the marine environment tends to be up to the 12M limit, but no 
scientific evidence for this is put forward.121 Again, this suggests that jurisdictional concerns 
(federal-provincial constitutional limits) may have been one deciding factor in addition to 
inshore water use complexities, such as coastal fisheries. The consequence of this exclusion is 
that the ESSIM area as defined is not justifiable neither on user nor on ecosystemic grounds.  
 
Fifth, the seaward limits of the ESSIM area are also uncertain. ESSIM is supposed to 
extend to the full extent of Canadian seaward jurisdiction, in this case the extended continental 
shelf in accordance with the Oceans Act and the UN Convention. However, Canada has not 
defined its outer limits and what is legally certain at this time is the limit of the EEZ at 200M. In 
the case of Newfoundland, offshore exploration and development licences have been granted 




The Oceans Act and the Oceans Strategy are the two major instruments that set out the policy 
framework for ICOM in Canada. In the case of the ESSIM initiative, however, the principal 
policy guidance has come not from the strategy, but from the act. Since 1999 the bulk of the 
initiative has run parallel to the development of the Oceans Strategy, with the strategy making a 
belated appearance as Canada’s national ocean policy only in the summer of 2002. By this time, 
the ESSIM initiative was already well-defined and with a proposed structure. The Oceans Act, on 
the other hand, because it performs the function of legislating the policy framework and 
directions for ICOM, and despite its high level of generality, served to guide the development of 
ESSIM. It is also conceivable that because ESSIM had conceptually advanced ahead of the 
strategy by the time of the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop, that the latter served to inform the 
former. There is little to suggest that the strategy added much to the ESSIM initiative which was 
not already anticipated and factored into. If this observation is correct, it suggests that at least 
insofar as this particular initiative in the Atlantic region is concerned, initiatives at the national 
level may tag along regional initiatives and that leadership in ICOM is more likely to be 
exercised at the frontline than at headquarters. The “learning-by-doing” approach at the 
operational level is more likely to guide this initiative than a highly generic national ocean 
policy. 
 
Because of its complexity and novelty it is difficult to judge the degree of efficiency in 
                                                 
121 Ibid., at 10. 
122 The formal definition of the outer limit would be by the Governor-in-Council acting 





the launching of the ESSIM initiative. It remains to be seen how the significant stakeholder input 
at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop will be used to strengthen the initiative. However, as will be 





The ESSIM operates within the statutory framework of the Oceans Act, but should also be 
expected to be governed by other relevant statutes and regulations governing marine activities, 
such as the Canada Shipping Act,123 Fisheries Act,124 Navigable Waters Protection Act,125 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,126 and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore 
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act.127 This is a substantial legal framework. The 
actual operational relationships between the general (Oceans Act) and dedicated (other statutes) 
legislation, mandates they confer on government bodies, rights granted to ocean users, and 
standards set out for various activities remain to be tested by an experimental integrated 
approach.  
 
The offshore focus of the ESSIM management area avoids potential difficulties of 
property and jurisdiction with the province of Nova Scotia. As noted earlier, Nova Scotia has 
historically maintained its position that it brought into confederation maritime property, and 
much of this is arguably located within bays and inshore waters. In proximity to the ESSIM 
management area, Nova Scotia considers Sable Island part of the province and also levies a 
charge for the laying of transatlantic cables over submarine areas it considers to be part of the 
province. Property matters apart, the federal government retains jurisdiction for navigation, 
shipping and fisheries and this is a facilitating factor in promoting integrated management in the 
ESSIM area. There is no legal uncertainty in this regard. 
 
Two constraining issues have already been alluded to earlier. The first is the lack of 
definition of the extended continental shelf, meaning that the full formal seaward extent of the 
ESSIM management area is not known and is thus subject to uncertainty. The second is the 
                                                 
123 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9. A new Canada Shipping Act, 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 26, has been 
legislated but is not yet in force. 
124 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. 
125 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22. 
126 S.C. 1999, c. 33. 
127 An overview of federal, provincial and international regulatory frameworks applicable 
to the ESSIM region is currently being prepared by DFO. Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM Forum 




implication of the potential for recognition of aboriginal resource constitutional rights in ESSIM. 
If the argument referred to earlier that aboriginal title is a form of encumbrance on crown title is 
pushed to its logical conclusion, then crown title over the resources of the EEZ and continental 
shelf are encumbered. 
 
There is also a substantive body of international law that applies to the ESSIM area, as 
may have been implemented through statutes or simply applicable as a matter of treaty or 
customary law. This body is relevant from two perspectives, the first being Canadian 
subscription to international instruments it is a party to, and the second consists of entitlements 
of the international community to use the ESSIM area. Examples of the latter include the right of 
unimpeded international navigation through the EEZ and the laying of submarine cables.128 
Although Canada is not a party to the UN Convention, it should take into consideration whether 
the placement of offshore installations and structures or its conservation policies in the ESSIM 




There are four levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal and aboriginal) and over 20 
federal and provincial bodies that could potentially be engaged in the ESSIM institutional 
framework.130 The ESSIM initiative proposes a planning and management structure that includes 
three major bodies, all of which are encompassed in the ESSIM Forum. The ESSIM Forum for 
this purpose should be distinguished from the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop, which did not 
include the full range of senior level representation expected in the area management structure 
yet to be established. Participants at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop noted that the proposed 
structure was unclear as to where authoritative decision-making lies and what the relationships 
among the major bodies would be. 
 
                                                 
128 UN Convention, note above, article 58. 
129 UN Convention, ibid., article 60. Article 60(1) provides that artificial islands, 
installations and structures and their safety zones “may not be established where interference 
may be caused to the use of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation.”The right 
of innocent passage and the duty of a coastal state to warn of dangers to international passage is 
protected by international law. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Reports, 
Judgment, 9 April 1949. 
130 See the introductory comments to the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop of Neil 
Bellefontaine, Regional Director-General, DFO Maritimes Region, Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM 




The first ESSIM body would be the Regional Committee on Government Affairs 
(RCGA), which should consist of government representatives at the federal and provincial levels. 
Composed of senior government officials, this is the first level of government engagement and 
clearly this body will have executive decision-making authority.131 Perhaps the real concern at 
the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop may not have been the lack of clarity in the relationships 
between bodies as much as the actual locus of the decision-making (i.e., a committee of senior 
government officials), which suggests that although the initiative is touted as collaborative and 
inclusive, in reality the ultimate authoritative decision remains a governmental one. A further 
issue with this body is the full extent of participation by aboriginal government. It is unclear 
whether the federal government will treat aboriginal governments as “governmental” partners or 
simply as stakeholders, although it is recognized that First Nation involvement would occur in all 
ESSIM bodies other than the Secretariat.132 It has been submitted that aboriginal groups are more 
than stakeholders. In addition, although the initiative recognizes the importance of 
municipalities, municipal governments are not included in this governmental structure. 
Presumably, two justifications might be that municipalities are creations of provincial 
governments (and therefore a provincial government de facto represents municipalities) and that 
the inshore is specifically excluded in the management area. Whereas the exclusion of 
municipalities logically results from the exclusion of inshore waters, one can anticipate a 
constraint in embarking on effective efforts to address marine pollution from land-based 
activities, where municipal governments have a significant role to play. 
 
This raises a question as to what is, or should be, the role of the second ESSIM body, the 
Oceans Management and Planning Group (OMPG). This body consists of a plenary (the OMPG 
proper, which includes stakeholders and government officials at the planning, but not senior 
decision-making level), the Plan Implementation Working Group (PIWG), as an OMPG sub-
committee, and works both within and outside the plenary, consists of government planning 
officials and also reports to the RCGA), and issues-based working groups (consisting of 
stakeholders and government officials). Much attention has been placed on the need to improve 
intergovernmental and interdepartmental coordination and this is reflected in the RCGA and 
PIWG. At the other end of the non-governmental spectrum, it is still moot as to how meaningful 
(i.e., to what extent there is involvement in decision-making) the structure and process in this 
second body really is. At the most, the OMPG can hope to influence decision-making by 
providing “information and advice” to the RCGA.133 This was generally found to be 
unsatisfactory by non-governmental participants at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop. 
                                                 
131 Development of Collaborative and Management Process, note above, at 19. The 
precursor of the RCGA is the federal-provincial government working group established in 
January 2001. It consists of representatives of over 20 federal and provincial government bodies. 
Bellefontaine, note above, at 53. 
132 Development of Collaborative and Management Process, note above, at 19. 





The third body is the ESSIM Secretariat and generally has been viewed favourably. Its 
role is facilitation and coordination throughout the structure. 
 
A matter which ESSIM has not addressed sufficiently is the sensitive subject of 
accountability. On the one hand transparency is evident throughout the whole process. The fact 
that the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop has occurred and the manner in which it has occurred is a 
significant milestone in ICOM  processes in Canada. The report of the workshop proceedings 
seems to have minimal if any bureaucratic filtering and thus contains some of the frankest 
reporting to date. Clearly, DFO (Maritimes) is committed to good process.  
 
What remains to be addressed is the difficult question of accountability in the context of 
inclusive processes. As a public service provider, government is subject to an accountability 
system that elevates to a political level: “the buck stops here!” Clearly, any government 
department is responsible and accountable for its programmes. However, in ICOM the DFO is a 
lead agency, and frequently the role it will play will be coordination and facilitation, and may not 
necessarily be the implementing institution. It will be interesting to see how collaborating 
governments and departments will share responsibility and accountability in this scenario, and 
especially in the context of a consensus-building process. If the intention behind the RCGA is to 
define a decision-making moment, then those institutions participating in the decision should be 
accountable for that decision.   
 
Ironically, that “decision-making moment” can be obfuscated if decision-making is 
further decentralized to enable more inclusive participation by stakeholders. Stakeholders are not 
necessarily public service providers and most likely  represent special interests. The dominant 
view by participants at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop was that there should be greater 
participation in the decision-making. However, to what extent participating stakeholders could 
be held accountable together with government, and the form of this accountability, are moot. The 
potential problem arises where stakeholders participate in decisions that affect other interest 
groups (e.g., designation of MPAs in places and in a manner that cause loss to other users, e.g., 
offshore oil and gas industry).134 The likelihood is that government, which cannot relinquish its 
public service responsibilities, will continue to be accountable for decisions, no matter how 




Although the Oceans Strategy and ESSIM are initiatives of the same department, the 
participatory process devised for the development of ESSIM is to be contrasted to that used to 
develop the strategy. As seen earlier, beyond the initial launch of the discussion paper and cross-
                                                 
134 E.g., MPA designation in areas already under offshore oil and gas licences. See Aldo 
Chircop and Bruce Marchand, “Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development in 




country consultations shortly thereafter, strategy development remained for the most part an in-
house affair until the release of the final document in the summer of 2002. In contrast, ESSIM 
was launched in 1999, various groups were consulted informally, two discussion documents 
were distributed in November 2001, an advisory committee of invited stakeholders was set up 
and a major workshop convened in February 2002 with over 150 participants. The workshop 
itself was novel in the manner stakeholders were able to react to components of ESSIM, and then 
to enable them to evaluate the workshop process. A survey was also conducted. At the end of the 
workshop stakeholders were invited to participate in the follow-up to the workshop. The 
workshop report is unusual for a government report in terms of its frankness. Irrespective of the 
substantive direction and content of ESSIM, the process to date is consistent with the 
collaborative approach advocated for ESSIM and suggests that stakeholder interest is likely to be 
maintained. 
 
There are weaknesses to be addressed in ESSIM processes. The first relates to the status 
to be given to First Nation participation. ESSIM needs to re-examine its current characterization 
of First Nations as stakeholders with reference to the emergence of aboriginal government as an 
aboriginal right. This is a development which is not restricted to ICOM and it affects all federal 
and provincial initiatives.135 Second, a significant gap in stakeholder participation to date is the 
absence of the transportation sector. This sector covers regulators, port authorities, industry 
(shipowners and service providers), and the various professions servicing the sector. Its 
relevance is manifold: it affects the regulation of all navigation in the ESSIM area, and 
consequently concerns all uses; standards for safety and marine environment protection are set at 
the international level, followed by domestic implementation (this will pose significant 
constraints to the use of regulatory tools in the ESSIM area); the transportation sector is 
responsible for Canada’s seaborne trade. It is to be noted that DFO has recognized this weakness 
and there is commitment to include this vital sector in the next ESSIM development phase. 
 
Given the diversity of interests that can be expected to continue to be involved in the 
development and eventual implementation of ESSIM it is to be expected that differences will 
frequently not be immediately reconcilable. It can be anticipated that a genuinely inclusive 
participatory process will serve as a conflict avoidance tool; however the ESSIM structure will 
need internal conflict management processes to address differences that mature into conflicts, 
such as, between levels of governments or between departments, multiple competing users, 
federal or provincial government and First Nations, First Nations and other fishing communities, 
and regulatory bodies and specific users or special interest groups. The Oceans Strategy 
recognizes that consensus-based decision-making may not always be possible and tough 
decisions may need to be taken when consensus cannot be reached.136 ESSIM does not have a 
                                                 
135 This difficulty has been recognised. See Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM Forum 
Workshop, note above, at 12, 38. 
136 With reference to integrated management bodies, “Even without the full endorsement 
or participation of some interests, some management actions will still proceed to meet existing 




similar proviso, yet. ESSIM could benefit from a mediation and conciliation service within its 
structure, but operating independently of ESSIM and probably also DFO.  
   
Resources 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the authority of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.” Policy and Operational Framework, note 




Like the Oceans Strategy, ESSIM is not accompanied by separate financial appropriation, and no 
funding was announced at the 1st ESSIM Workshop.137 Its principal resource is institutional. 
DFO (Maritimes) has designated the Oceans and Coastal Management Division to service this 
initiative, and eventually to become its secretariat. Other federal departments and the provincial 
government have been involved and this suggests that there are institutional costs for these 
participants as well. Several stakeholders participating in the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop 
expressed concern over the time demands of volunteer participation.138 However, these resources 




At this early stage, no quality assurance system has been publicly discussed in anticipation of 
inclusion in the future integrated management plan for the ESSIM region. A preliminary desk 
assessment of knowledge and institutional capabilities to address ecosystem objectives has been 
undertaken.140 A draft integrated management plan will be developed for submission to the 2nd 
ESSIM Forum Workshop scheduled for March 2003.141 The drafting process is expected to 
include management objectives and indicators.142 
 
 
The Atlantic Coastal Action Program  
 
                                                 
137 Assistant Deputy Minister King’s keynote address is conspicuously silent on this 
point. King, note above, at 56-62. 
138 Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop, note above, at 13, 21-23, and 32.  
139 One discussion table at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop had the following to say: 
“The table considered the plan elements as being too broad and unattainable. It stressed the need 
for prioritization with timelines for the short- and long-term, with ongoing monitoring. It also 
expressed the need to define the area and process for developing the plan. Support is needed - 
who will pay for the plan? It was cautioned that one industry could not fund all the elements.” 
Ibid., at 32. 
140 S. Coffen-Smout et al., “Ocean Activities and Ecosystem Issues on the Eastern 
Scotian Shelf: An Assessment of Current Capabilities to Address Ecosystem Objectives,” 
(Ottawa: Canadian Stock Assessment Secretariat, Research Document 2001/095,  2001). 
141 Proceedings of the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop, note above, at 47. 




Not all ICOM initiatives in Canada derive from or necessarily operate under the auspices of the 
Oceans Act, Oceans Strategy or the leadership and facilitation of the Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans (DFO).  In fact, for the past several decades, a number of other federal departments 
and provincial agencies have been developing and supporting ‘unofficial’ integrated coastal 
management initiatives across the country that are designed to address and are delivering on 
many of the principles and approaches espoused in current Canadian ICOM thinking.143  Many 
of these initiatives are due, in part, to a growing desire and capacity of coastal stakeholders for a 
more participatory form of democracy and a maturing attitude by governments toward sharing 
responsibility for planning and management in coastal areas. 
 
One example of a federally-initiated program of this nature, is the Atlantic Coastal Action 
Program (ACAP) which was launched by the Atlantic Region office of the federal environment 
agency (Environment Canada) in 1991.144 ACAP was established to build the capacity of 
ecosystem-based communities throughout Atlantic Canada so that they could assume the lead in 
determining their own long-term goals and environmental priorities, build multi-sectoral 
partnerships in their communities, and undertake direct action to address local issues that 
constrain the sustainability of their watersheds and adjacent coastal areas.   
 
At the time of writing ACAP is a network of 14 community-driven, watershed-based 
ecosystem initiatives located in the four Atlantic provinces.  There are presently five ACAP sites 
in each of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and two each in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
Prince Edward Island.145  With over ten years of experience in ACAP, there are a number of 
lessons learned that derive from objective analysis and day-to-day operation.146 
 
                                                 
143 For a discussion on past initiatives and historical development of ICOM in Canada see 
L.P. Hildebrand, Canada’s Experience with Coastal Zone Management (Halifax: Oceans 
Institute of Canada, 1989).  
144 For a more in-depth description and analysis of ACAP, see Ellsworth, et al., note 
above. 
145 The sites/organizations are: Nova Scotia: Clean Annapolis, Pictou Harbour, Bluenose 
ACAP, ACAP Cape Breton and Sable Island; New Brunswick: Eastern Charlotte Waterways 
Inc., St. Croix, ACAP Saint John, Miramichi River, Madawaska; Newfoundland: St. John’s 
Harbour, Humber Arm; Prince Edward Island: Bedeque Bay, Southeast Environmental. For 
details on and contact information for each ACAP organization see: 
http://www.atl.ec.gc.ca/community/acap/index_e.html (accessed 30 October 2002). 
146 See “Lessons Learned: Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP),” 
http://www.atl.ec.gc.ca/community/acap/lessons.html (accessed 1 November 2002). For the full 
report see S. Moir, ACAP: Lessons Learned, a Moir Consulting report prepared for Environment 






ACAP was established in response to both an increasing concern by the public about the 
environmental quality and sustainability of the Atlantic coastal zone and their growing demand 
to be more actively and meaningfully involved in the decisions concerning their future.147 
 
Problems and baselines  
 
Before the establishment of ACAP in 1991, the most commonly held viewpoint within 
government was that problems, information needs and optimal solutions were ‘known’ by 
government experts and the challenge was to convince others of what they already knew.  
Communities, for their part, sometimes looked to government for answers to their local 
questions, and yet were often disappointed when the response did not appear to fit their 
circumstances.  ACAP changed this mental model that both government and communities had of 
each other.  Through ACAP, local citizens, Environment Canada staff, and other government and 
non-government stakeholders came together as peers to discuss concerns, exchange ideas, and 
negotiate their own interests.  Realistic solutions have been developed and implemented that 
meet communities’ environmental concerns, as well as their economic and social goals.  Many of 
the solutions go well beyond the immediate scope of any single department or level of 
government, thus requiring an integrated approach. ACAP is an innovative attempt to overcome 
the litany of sectorally-oriented and government-controlled planning and management initiatives 
traditionally practised in Atlantic Canada and elsewhere. 
 
In traditional public involvement processes, the public does not share in the responsibility 
or ownership of the proposed initiative since the need was not established by them and the 
ongoing implementation is usually totally out of their hands.  There is, therefore, little incentive 
for the public to work for creative and alternative solutions, but only to criticize.  Conversely, 
multi-stakeholder processes are by nature inclusive and recognize the rights of all interested 
parties to be at the decision-making table. Their decisions reflect a wide range of interests and 
ideas, and result in a better understanding of the constraints and opportunities facing each 
stakeholder.  The group becomes the proponent and champion of the project or initiative, leading 







                                                 
147 Various studies have documented environmental and resource degradation, increasing 
use conflicts and consequent socio-economic hardship. See for example P. B. Eaton, L. P. 
Hildebrand and A. A. D'Entremont, Environmental Quality in the Atlantic Region 1985, 






ACAP was designed spatially on coastal watershed-estuary management units148 and 
functionally on community leadership.  The 14 areas currently in the program range from 
medium-sized to large watershed-estuary complexes that contain several municipalities and vary 
from urban-industrial to rural-agricultural settings.  As the Oceans Strategy excludes rivers and 
lakes, and by implication, watersheds, the watershed-based model employed in ACAP should 
play a complementary role to other integrated management initiatives developed by DFO. 
 
The majority of the sites have tended to be of a small size, and where the watershed was 
large, the participating communities tended to be well-defined. The combination of small size 
and well-defined communities enables participants to more easily relate to the local impact of 




The first five years of ACAP were focussed on building the community organizations, their 
institutions, priorities and partners.  The final product of the groups’ first phase planning efforts 
was the formulation of a Comprehensive Environmental Management Plan (CEMP), consisting 
of a long-term strategy for the local ecosystem. While there was no one prescribed methodology 
that all sites had to or chose to follow, six components generally describe the process of 
developing a CEMP: (1) formation and incorporation of a multi-stakeholder organization that is 
representative of the community; (2) reaching consensus on an integrated community-based 
environmental, social and economic vision and well-defined use objectives for the future of the 
area; (3) developing a common set of goals and objectives for their ecosystem; (4) conducting an 
environmental quality assessment that includes gathering relevant data to determine baseline 
environmental conditions and the issues affecting environmental quality; (5) identification of 
remedial options to close the gap between existing and desired levels of environmental quality; 
and (6) reaching a broad consensus on an implementation schedule complete with timelines, a 
financial plan and the identification of those responsible for carrying out the necessary actions. 
 
All sites have geographical information systems to integrate data from users, local 





In ACAP, the traditional role of government is shared with the local organizations that are 
established in each coastal ecosystem.  Instead of government departments being the lead 
                                                 
148 Each community initiative sets its boundaries pragmatically based upon the interests 
and the issues at hand; in each case, the watershed serves as the organizing spatial framework for 




agencies that set policy and priorities, the communities assume this function at the local scale 
and the government agencies become partners in responding to their identified needs.  
 
There has not been any conscious and systematic treatment of principles of sustainable 
development (as espoused in the Rio Declaration), but at the same time ACAP partners have 
been guided by a generalised sense of sustainability of the local ecosystems they are a part of and 
depend on. It is interesting to note that at this local level the discourse is not dominated by 
polished concepts employed by scholarly and bureaucratic elites, but rather by participants’ basic 




ACAP was founded on two basic premises.  The first, is that complex coastal issues cannot be 
resolved without an holistic, inclusive, participatory, ecosystem-based approach that can 
influence behaviours that impact negatively on environmental quality and community 
sustainability.  Second, that most solutions to environmental and natural resource management 
issues will not be effective unless the range of participants in coastal governance is expanded to 
include all those with a stake in the decisions that are taken concerning coastal resources and 
uses and that stakeholders are provided with the capacity and the opportunity to take ownership 
of issues and responsibility for their solution. 
 
‘Community’ in the context of ACAP does not refer solely to traditional geographical or 
political conceptions. Community in this instance refers to the degree of ‘common interest and 
unity’ amongst social, economic and environmental stakeholders.  The institutional actors in the 
local ACAP organizations include: municipalities, businesses and industries, universities, federal 
and provincial government agencies, non-government organizations, First Nations and 
environmental groups. Citizens at large also participate. Thousands of volunteers and youth are 
engaged on local priorities.  The involvement of First Nations is also developing. 
 
Perhaps the most important ingredient in keeping the ACAP organizations functioning is 
a capable and respected community coordinator who is hired, not by government, but by the 
local organizations.  The coordinators and several project and administrative staff are the only 
paid individuals in the ACAP process at the community level; all other participants are 
volunteers. A concern, and occasional constraint, is “volunteer burnout.” To address this 
problem, Environment Canada facilitates occasional volunteer training workshops and place a 
priority on recognizing and supporting their volunteers. 
 
While the ACAP approach made intuitive sense to those at the community level, it was a 
bold step for the federal government in Canada.  For government, the program has presented 
several challenges.  These include: changing of the corporate culture from hierarchical, linear 
delivery to one of horizontal, or team delivery; shifting from the command-and-control model to 
one of enabler and facilitator (Environment Canada sits on ACAP committees as a stakeholder 
and not as controller); the adoption of information and data to meet community needs; the 




to support community initiatives; and the recognition of management scenarios arrived at 
through community consensus.   
 
To meet these challenges in their modus operandi, bureaucrats as individuals needed to 
develop new skills and perspectives.  This shift occurred rapidly in those individuals who sit on 
the local ACAP committees directly (referred to as ‘Windows’)149. These “windows” have 
repeatedly stated that they have found their work with communities to be one of the highlights of 
their careers in terms of what they have learned, and what they have been able to accomplish.  It 
took more time, however, for the concept to infiltrate into and up the bureaucratic system to the 
point where senior management and departmental scientists understood the need and accepted 
this sharing of control. 
 
ACAP organizations have had positive effects on their communities and individual and 
organizational behaviour, and have become major contributors towards local sustainable 
development.  Strong partnerships, key alliances and multi-stakeholder membership are key 
components to the success of this process. Persons interested in local sustainable development or 
who are impacting the local environment are encouraged to participate. This open and inclusive 
approach has provided a cooperative forum for persons with competing views or who do not 




A basic premise of ACAP is that the level of public participation in ICOM initiatives must go 
beyond the mere provision of information and consultation with the public. Rather than being 
government-driven, the participatory process is led by locally incorporated multi-stakeholder 
community organizations. The federal government involvement was in the form of seed funding 
and initial facilitation, but control rests with local participants. 
 
Environment Canada is the federal government sponsor of the program and a partner in 
each of the ACAP initiatives.  Like other partners, the federal government participates in 
direction setting, issues identification and the selection of appropriate responses to issues and 
priorities on a par with other participants. It contributes funds, information, expertise and 
services.  Interestingly, by participating in this strategic manner the federal government is in 
effect achieving departmental objectives and desired results, such as improvements in air and 
water quality, characterization and remediation of toxic contaminants, habitat protection and 
restoration, weather and environmental prediction, and understanding and preparing for the 
                                                 
149 An ACAP ‘Window’ is an Environment Canada scientist, engineer, economist, 
program manager or technical expert  assigned (normally on a voluntary basis) to work directly 
with one of the ACAP organizations over the long-term. ‘Windows’ function as a two-way 
liaison between the department and the community organization’s Board of Directors, sitting as 




predicted impacts of climate change.  Like other partners, Environment Canada participates in 




The first phase of ACAP (1991-1997) required a large portion of funding to be obtained from 
Environment Canada for planning, institution building and direct action projects.  As the 
program and the local institutions matured, funding needed from the department declined 
steadily  as partnerships grew and funding diversified. Today Environment Canada contributes 
fewer funds per site and provides other support. It enters into annual Letters of Agreement with 
each of the ACAP organizations and provides funds ($50,000-$60,000 per year), technical, 
scientific and program support to undertake planning, management and action projects in pursuit 
of departmental and ACAP organization objectives. Environment Canada works with the ACAP 
organizations to bring other federal and provincial departments as additional partners to local 
initiatives.150  
 
In turn, the actual implementation of plans of action is the responsibility of the local 
ACAP organizations. These organizations are expected to build local partnerships, secure 
additional funding from other sources and undertake work in the field. 
 
In addition to Environment Canada, other federal and provincial departments, 
universities, foundations and industries have partnered with ACAP organizations to provide 
further support.  The diversification of partners, as well as funding has increased ACAP sites’ 
sustainability and independence. 
 
A concern in the eyes of the observer is whether ACAP sites are truly sustainable and 
could survive a hypothetical termination of Environment Canada funding, considering sporadic 
federal government funding cuts. It is likely that most sites would survive, but that some might 
face a difficult adjustment process, if not struggle. However, it is useful to consider the federal 
government contribution and its impact in a larger context. Local resources appear to be accessed 
and used efficiently. For example, of the total cash funding provided to all ACAP groups only 
32% has come from ACAP.  In addition to this funding, ACAP groups have received large 
contributions of donated labour, services, and materials. The modest $12 million invested since 
ACAP’s inception was used to leverage an almost $100 million product by the ACAP groups 
themselves. In fact the argument in support of sustainability can be taken much farther. In terms 
of the impact of the local ACAP organizations on the Atlantic economy, a recent study of ACAP 
                                                 
150 Environment Canada has developed Memoranda of Understanding with provincial 
agencies in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island that facilitate greater coordination of and 
cooperation with community-based initiatives in those provinces. In Nova Scotia, 35 federal and 
provincial agencies are collaborating in support of government harmonization and streamlined 





over the five-year period 1997-2001 calculated the total GDP impacts to be in excess of $22 
million, a taxation impact of $8.03M and the creation of 482 person-years of employment.151  
The same study estimated that if Environment Canada had attempted to undertake the same suite 
of projects and activities that the 14 ACAP organizations have completed over the same period, 
it would have cost the department over $71 million; a significant increase over the $6.1 million 
invested. In summary, it does not appear that the existence of most individual ACAP sites, as 
distinct from the federal program that supports them, would be threatened if federal ACAP funds 




Like the other federal initiatives discussed in this chapter, ACAP did not start with a well-
defined set of baselines and performance indicators to enable continual performance 
measurement of the program as a whole. There is no ongoing programmatic performance 
assessment but periodic external evaluations are conducted. However, separately from the 
programmatic level, each site has had a comprehensive environmental evaluation and 
consequently baselines have tended to be defined on a site basis. Also at each site the major 
monitoring event is the annual general meeting at the site and in which participants and the 
public participate. Performance objectives are set annually at this level, and progress on these is 
the subject of the annual report. 
 
Phase II of ACAP (1998-2003) focussed on implementing individual site strategies, 
expanding the ACAP network, and collaborating with others to better understand science and 
achieve measurable ecosystem goals.  Phase III (2003-2006) will continue with the existing 
model and community partners, but will add more sites, continue to work with multi-stakeholder 
coalitions at a larger regional ecosystem scale, support greater networking and knowledge 
sharing among the sites, plus take more cooperative, theme-based approaches (e.g., sewage).152 
 
In terms of accomplishments to date, over 800 projects have been undertaken by the 14 
ACAP organizations, involving hundreds of organizations and thousands of volunteers. Results 
have included pollution prevention programs for business and households, restored habitats, the 
establishment of new parks, the creation of artificial wetlands for enhanced sewage treatment, 
training and education workshops for youth and the unemployed, sustainable forestry 
                                                 
151 Gardner Pinfold Consulting Economists Ltd., “An Evaluation of the Atlantic Coastal 
Action Program (ACAP): Economic Impact and Return on Investment,” Report prepared for 
Environment Canada (Halifax, 2002). 
152 The Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership (BoFEP) and the Southern Gulf of St. 
Lawrence Coalition on Sustainability are two larger regional ecosystem-based initiatives in 
Atlantic Canada that receive support and partnership participation from Environment Canada and 
many other government agencies. See http://netshop.net/~bofep/ (accessed 9 November 2002) 




management plans for industry and landowners, reforestation of riparian zones, the development 
of environmental farm plans, scientific research studies,153 air and water quality programs, 
climate change projects and shellfish remediation activities. In some sites there has been a 
significant spill-over of activity outside the original environmental realm to include crime 
prevention, health education, youth training and employment. 
 
Additionally, several  ACAP organizations have established community resource centres 
providing the public, students, businesses and educators with sustainability information and 
responding to various inquiries and concerns. Today, most ACAP organizations are considered 
reliable third-parties in their communities, trusted by all stakeholders and depended on for 
reliable information.  ACAP organizations are also tackling priority region-wide issues.  For 
example, ACAP convened a Coastal Communities Sewage Workshop in Lunenburg in October, 
1999, and is now developing a regional strategy among all ACAP organizations and others to 




The buzzword syndrome 
 
“Sustainability,” “integration,” “process,” “partnership,” “precaution,” “transparency,” 
“responsibility,” “accountability,” “stewardship,” “collaboration,” “ecosystem approach,” among 
others: the practice of ICOM in Canada is replete with buzzwords. It is unfortunate that concepts 
which should be useful for policy, planning and management are so frequently overused, 
misused or used loosely to the extent that their utility is severely diluted. Perhaps one of the 
major weaknesses of the Oceans Strategy is that it suffers from the buzzword syndrome: it places 
faith in repeated concepts without offering much substantive and action-oriented content. The 
concepts obviously provide political kudos, but little management content. In fairness, these 
concepts do carry underlying values and  all initiatives need to at least formally acknowledge 
them; however, beyond the ritual of respect lies the task of articulating  the “who,” “when,” 




A comparative exercise of the three initiatives leads to a number of observations.  
 
The three  initiatives were not triggered by crises or any one individual event. At the 
most, they were initiated as an exercise of a legal mandate and possibly under osmotic pressure 
                                                 
153 A component of ACAP is “Science Linkages” which makes available $250,000 per 
year for science and research projects that are jointly proposed, developed and implemented by 
one of more ACAP organizations in full cooperation with one or more EC scientists. S. Dech, 
“ACAP's Science Linkages Initiative: A Sound Investment in Science and Community,” Internal 




from a changing operational environment and public expectations. All three had or have a 
significant gestation periods. This suggests that integrated initiatives require trial-and-error and 
learning-by-doing accompanied by many  inter/intra-institutional transactions. Compared with 
some past sectoral policies which had short gestation and specific triggers, such as a resource 
collapse or fiscal cuts, the three initiatives were not “jolted” into existence. Thus integration 
initiatives  are less likely to be reflex reactions than crafted pioneering experiments.  
 
With reference to a problem-oriented approach, ACAP is perhaps the clearest of the three 
initiatives in terms of what it hopes to achieve. A management area is a combination of 
community, watershed and estuary functioning as a system. This approach seems to have 
worked, but at the same time it should be remembered that the scale was local. ESSIM is also 
local, but on a larger scale. The definition of the management area is spatial, possibly use-biased, 
and not problem-oriented. The extent to which an ecosystem-based approach will work in a 
spatially defined management area remains to be seen, but then the focus is on the offshore, not 
inshore, and thus fewer user conflicts can be expected. The Oceans Strategy is national in scope 
and provides a framework for LOMAs and coastal management areas. Again, it is more spatial in 
orientation than problem-oriented. It is suggested that the future relevance of the Oceans 
Strategy and ESSIM will depend on the extent to which they will allow smaller scale local 
problem-oriented (proactive and reactive) approaches. 
 
All three initiatives support an integrated approach to knowledge. The Oceans Strategy 
and ESSIM do not indicate how the natural science will actually relate to social science, user and 
aboriginal knowledge. A challenge for DFO as a lead agency is to articulate an approach to 
knowledge-building that is seen to be efficient and equitable, while not being unduly biased 
towards natural science, its traditional knowledge base. ACAP offers a lesson here in terms of 
how local knowledge of the area is married to the scientific and technical support provided by 
Environment Canada in playing a facilitating role. But in all three cases, there is still 
experimentation in terms of the multi-disciplinary inputs into decision-making and the 
interdisciplinary decision outputs. 
 
The policy experience is different in the three initiatives. ACAP enjoys a simple policy 
environment, administered mostly by one federal department and applied at the regional level. 
Because Environment Canada provides seed money to generate local integrated planning and 
management initiatives, it is not dirigiste. The Oceans Strategy, on the other hand, is the policy 
expression of a department mandated to play a national lead role by statute. The dilemma for 
DFO is two-fold: (1) scope-versus-focus in the strategy; (2) no prejudice to the mandates of other 
departments. The generality of the strategy has to compete with the specificity of sectoral 
policies, while hoping to provide a coordinating framework that involves departments that do not 
have a counterpart duty to follow to the DFO’s duty to lead. As a result, the Oceans Strategy 
tries to be everything to everyone without stepping on anyone’s toes. ESSIM commenced before 
the policy environment of the Oceans Strategy was created and is unlikely to be affected by any 
perceptions of a weak national policy. On the contrary, ESSIM is more likely to be perceived as 
providing content to the strategy at the regional level and perhaps further influence its 








The legal factors have produced the same constitutional constraints to all three 
initiatives. Environment Canada had to take into consideration the interests and views of 
Nova Scotia over Sable Island as a new ACAP site. It also needed to ensure support for 
initiatives in all four Atlantic provinces. The Oceans Strategy had to ensure 
intergovernmental partnerships and involvement of First Nations. This underlies the 
federal and aboriginal constitutional realities in Canada and is further mandated by the 
Oceans Act. It will not be possible to undertake the coastal side of ICOM without full 
provincial participation. ESSIM is also reflective of the constitutional constraint: DFO 
has chosen to focus the initiative to the offshore where there are potentially fewer 
constraints at a distance from provincial shores and inshore waters. Even in the offshore, 
however, ESSIM  has to contend with the realities of federal-provincial boards for 
offshore development (themselves constituting a politico-constitutional compromise) and 
claims of aboriginal peoples. Also, ESSIM has to contend with rights of offshore actors 
(e.g., licenced offshore operators) acquired under other departmental sectoral legislation. 
 
Together with the constitutional framework, the institutional issues are a major 
constraint. ACAP overcame potential institutional difficulties early by working out 
compromises with individual provincial governments. But then Environment Canada had 
less of a need to work closely with other federal departments than DFO in the context of 
the Oceans Strategy and ESSIM. As pointed out, DFO has legal duty to lead, but this 
does not have a counterpart duty for other departments in the Oceans Act. The 
consequence is that DFO’s transaction efforts and costs can be expected to be 
significantly high, and with no new financial resources allocated to oceans, its ability to 
influence the behaviour of other departments is necessarily constrained. The alternative 
for DFO is to avoid turfing and  exercise less of directing lead role in favour of a broader 
consensus-based approach with other federal departments, in order to promote buy-in and 
cross-departmental commitment of resources.  
 
There are significant novelties in the participatory processes promoted by ACAP 
and ESSIM. ACAP now has an established local decision-making and implementation 
process led by coastal communities and facilitated, not directed by the federal 
government. Although not all potentially important stakeholders are involved, the ESSIM 
development process likewise has a creative and successful approach to stakeholder 
involvement. The promotion of inclusive participation is no longer purely a matter for 
administrative discretion, but one of legal necessity under the Oceans Act and procedural 
fairness in an administrative state. 
 
It remains to be seen whether ESSIM can maintain the process and pace it has set 
without new departmental financial resources. The danger is that demanding, but well-
meaning stakeholders will expect follow-up at a time when resources are not available. If 
DFO were to slow down the process until funds are available, it could in turn affect 
credibility and continued involvement. Thus, although the ESSIM participatory process is 
highly credible, the expectations and demands of participants may be difficult to meet. 
And this is a major difficulty that will keep haunting DFO in exercising its oceans 
mandate: resources for oceans will likely have to come from resources for fisheries. In 




wrath of a historically influential fisheries constituency. ACAP, on the other, has no such 
difficulty. Environment Canada is a contributing partner and its monies are in effect part 
of a more diversified resource portfolio. As a result, ACAP has greater prospects of 
continuity than ESSIM at this moment in time. 
 
A difficulty shared by all three initiatives is the lack of baselines and specific 
performance indicators normally needed to monitor and measure progress against. The 
Oceans Strategy speaks to indicators in a general sense, but omits reference to baselines 
altogether. ESSIM has not yet started to address this issue. Without such framework in 
place, any assessment of progress is more likely to be open to subjective and political 
influences. It is suggested that an ICOM evaluation approach still needs to be developed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a qualitative and comparative weighing of key factors suggests that the 
ICOM experience in Canada is mixed and significantly more complex than the exchange 
between the Parliamentary Committee on Fisheries and Oceans and the federal 
government presented at the beginning of this chapter suggests. There is much more to 
ICOM than the Oceans Act. 
 
Although it is not possible to determine whether any of the three initiatives 
presented have bettered the marine environment, this being a long-term impact evaluation 
issue, it is possible to assess the process of crafting, articulating and implementing an 
integrated approach. A major achievement is clearly the novel and creative participatory 
processes at the regional and local level. Inclusive participatory processes are truly 
consistent with the commitment to the integrated approach. In the case of ACAP, other 
significant achievements are consistency, resource-diversification and continuity. Major 
under-achievements are the insufficient management of inter-institutional relations (in the 
context of departmental and constitutional turfing), continued lack of federal resources 
for ICOM at the regional and national levels (which suggests insufficient profiling of 
oceans on the national agenda)  and absence of appropriate monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks. 
 
Finally, would ICOM in Canada fare better if Canada were a unitary rather than a federal 
state? Probably yes. Federalism requires a continuous management of the relationships 
that keep the individual parts attached to the greater whole while allowing diversity to 
flourish. Most unitary states do not have to contend with this process as a premise.  
ICOM is complex enough in terms of the high degree of integration needed. As a result 
ICOM in Canada is competing with tough national issues and is easily marginalised when 
resources at the national federal table are scarce and issues are prioritized. Where should 
this leave the ICOM policy maker, planner and manager? There is a lesson from ACAP 
that sticks out: local, small, community-centred, inclusive and low-resourced ICOM 
initiatives now have a proven track record. 
